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1 - The Challenges of Pluralistic Societies with Dissimilar Cultural 
Identities and Religious Traditions: from a Melting pot to a Cultural 
Mosaic 
 
The cultural pattern of dispossession, displacement, and exile is -
unfortunately- as old as mankind´s history. Violent, compulsory or even 
peaceful but uncontainable migrations, often because of wars, invasions, 
ethnic cleansing, and eradication of minorities is a regrettable constant 
pattern in human history. Subjugation, expulsion, and repopulation have 
                                                          
1 This text, not peer reviewed, is an extended version of the paper “The Challenge of 
Dual and Plural Legal Systems: Religious and Secular Jurisdictions” presented at Essaouira 
(Morocco) at the Conference Islam and Modernity organized by The Three Cultures of the 
Mediterranean Foundation and The International Council for Middle East Studies 
(ICMES) with the collaboration of the Association Essaouira Mogador, on September 14th, 
2017; and at the Bruno Kessler Foundation in Trento (Italy) at the Conference Exiting 
violence: the role of religion. From texts to theories, hold on October 10-11, 2017. 
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been the most common elements of segregation and disintegration in 
world´s history; most of the times as a result of religious, ethnic, or racial 
policies in a world ideologically divided between us and the others.  
In the European Continent, Barbarian Confederate tribes -Goths, 
Heruli, Vandals, Suevi, Huns, Franks, Lombards, Angles, Saxons, Vikings, 
Normans, Huns, Slavs, Bulgarians, Magyars, Gepids, Avars, Pechenegs, 
Cumans, and many more. As well as the Berbers and the Vandals along 
the Mediterranean coastline of Africa at the dusk of the Eastern Roman 
Empire- occupied and ruled the territories in which they settled, initially 
as foederati or as raiders in the peripheries of the Empire. 
In the pre-Islamic era, among others, Turkic peoples and Saracens -
initially known as people from the Arabian Peninsula, including among 
other pagans, Jews, Judeo-Christians, Nestorian, Assyrians, Ishmaelite and 
Muslims, some of them Bedouins- occupied, raided or invaded lands and 
domains in the Near, the Middle and the Far East; as in Medieval times 
did the Khazars or the Mongols.  
Everywhere, from the Antiquity to today´s world, the process from 
segregation to integration among conquerors, settlers and immigrants 
with the indigenous and local population it is -as it always was- a long, 
complex, uneven and painful process of blending cultures and dissimilar 
communities. The cycle from segregation to integration is a constant 
pattern in human history. 
Under the paradigm of assimilation, metaphorically identified as a 
melting pot, nation-states as the US, Canada or Australia were built up 
from massive immigration waves, developing their own rules and legal 
strategies to encourage the assimilation process. The US, for example, used 
the powerful narrative of Americanism as a secular-civic religion, 
becoming indeed a form of indoctrination about the belief in the US sacred 
values, as a secular nation of Protestant roots, under the political model of 
a Constitutional Republic. American identity binds her citizens under the 
motto Pluribus Unum (One from many), demanding full loyalty to the US 
values promoting full assimilation. Civic religion became in the US the 
binding patriotic religion with one language, English. It is not a 
completely new form of patriotism; Ancient Rome under Octavius 
Augustus developed her own civic identity, Dea Roma, worshiping her 
imperial values and expanding her language, Latin, as strategy to unify 
dissimilar cultures from Hispania and North Africa to the Middle East. It 
was a long process from legal separation between Romans and non-
Romans to a progressive integration of dissimilar cultures under a 
common Roman citizenship as bonding identity to the Empire. 
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Language and religion, in a broad sense as a theistic or as a political 
belief, are the dynamic tools that channeled the development of new 
blended identities from Antiquity to today. It was, and still it is, a process 
by which legislation is an essential part, sometimes enforcing the 
separation or the segregation of communities to prevent violence. Other 
times, laws became an instrument for their unification and 
homogenization promoting a common identity. Legislation and judicial 
courts were the main instruments for maintaining or changing these two 
opposed paradigms -segregation and assimilation- in order to have 
control over the population.  
Europe has been an example of both paradigms, from the Germanic 
hegemony of the Western Roman Empire and the Christian and Muslim 
clashes along the Mediterranean region to the Catholic and Protestant 
wars, which took place all over the Holy Roman Empire. The colonial 
European Empires repeated the pattern of invasion, conquest, occupation, 
and subjugation by segregation. The newborn American Republics of the 
19th century were not an exception to this regretful human pattern in 
history.  
The US Government by its legislation marginalized and confined 
Native-Americans in reservations; African Americans had a long path 
struggling for emancipation from slavery first and later for the liberation 
from the Jim Crow laws and the racial segregation norms until the sixties. 
The different waves of migrations to the US of Irish, Italians, Latinos, 
Chinese, Jews, as new the immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, India 
or Far East are creating a new social fabric in which the Anglo-American 
WASPs and their cultural values are becoming a minority struggling to 
maintain their social and political hegemony. "Make America Great 
Again" is the slogan of Trump´s electoral narrative trying to update the 
belief in their supremacy. It is not a new narrative. In the Ancient Rome in 
the 1st (between 29-19 BC), during the transition from a Republic to an 
Autocracy, Virgil was commissioned by Octavius to compose the Latin 
epic the Aeneid with purpose of exalting the glorification the Roman 
Empire and its cultural values: "You, Roman, must govern the Empire and 
the peoples of the world”, proclaims the Aeneid 2. 
The USA transformation from a social melting pot during the 20th 
century -as a process of integration assimilating the WASP´s system of 
values- to a cultural mosaic in which communities demand the 
                                                          
2 Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento (hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere 
morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos: Aeneis, VI, 851 - 853. 
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development of their own identities under the dynamics of a new 
multicultural global world. Many other countries in the world with 
increasing waves of immigration are facing similar challenges. Two main 
questions emerge confronting this 21st century´s challenge: 
 
 Is it possible the development of a new paradigm of coexistence 
and integration without the negative aspects of assimilation, like 
the loss of traditions, values, and identity?  
 What are the advantages of coexistence and the dangers of juridical 
fragmentation by implementing plural jurisdictions? 
 
To address these questions I propose an initial historical look at two 
powerful legal religious traditions: the European Catholic and the Muslim. 
In my view, it is necessary to travel back in time more than the American 
and French revolutions to be able to outline these questions from a 
historical perspective as an evolving dynamic process. Human history did 
not start with Modernity, although most of the sociologists and political 
scientists focus their studies from there when the secular paradigm was 
born. This approach will allow us exploring how has been historically 
resolved the legal challenge of coexistence among dissimilar cultures. 
Complex processes, centuries old, have developed Catholic and Muslim 
legal traditions. What lessons can we learn from this legal past? 
 
 
2 - European Catholic Tradition of Dual Legislation and Jurisdiction 
 
Until the 18th century, the religious paradigm dominated over Christian 
and Muslim kingdoms and empires. Religion, as a core of beliefs, was an 
essential part of their identity as a community, protected by the ruler 
through his laws and indeed an instrument of power and domination. The 
Roman Empire was not an exception; the Dea Roma worship, as a civic 
religion, was bonding the Roman identity. The Imperial legislation from 
Constantine in 313 AD to Theodosius in 381 AD developed the Christian 
Roman Empire; since then, the Church became progressively entangled to 
the Empire. During this period, by imperial decrees ecclesiastical 
authorities had the power of jurisdiction through a new legal institution, 
the Episcopalis Audientia (Bishop´s Audience). The result was the 
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2.1 - The Development of the Religious Jurisdiction: from the 
Episcopalis Audientia under the Christian Roman Empire to the 
Homologation of Religious Decisions by a Civil Judge 
 
The Constantinian-Theodosian era introduces mediation and arbitration 
through a legal institution, the Episcopalis Audientia, in which Roman 
Imperial Law gives to the bishops the authority to mediate in conflicts 
among members of their dioceses. The first Constantinian constitution on 
the Episcopal Audience is from the year 3183; it was a powerful imperial 
institution that contributed to the development of canonical equity. In the 
Justinian era, the Episcopal Audience takes on a procedural character 
giving jurisdictional power to the bishops in the civil sphere, becoming 
another path to achieve imperial justice. Previously, during the Diocletian 
rule in the 3rd century, the judicial institution of the defensor civitatis was 
the mechanism giving access to justice for poor litigants, but progressively 
bishops absorbed its role by the Episcopal Audience becoming a usual 
litigation procedure for Roman citizens. The Novella 86 from the year 539, 
entitles bishops with the role of vigilance and control in the imperial 
administration of justice; therefore, the imperial administrative 
decentralization is strengthening. In the year 546, Novella 123 facilitates 
that Episcopal and secular jurisdictions exercise reciprocally the power of 
justice. Later on, Episcopal jurisdiction is revitalized and expanded in 
Europe by the 9th century´s Frankish Carolingian imperial model, later by 
the Ottonian dynasty, and since the 11th century by the Holy Roman 
Empire structure until the Protestant Reformation. The legacy of this dual 
jurisdiction and legislation, secular and religious, was the key source in 
the development of the European Common Law.  
The Catholic Church, as Imperial Church, builds up her own legal 
system, Canon Law, initially as a body of canonical rules from church 
councils. Canon Law absorbed the Roman legal rules and praxis, creating 
its own legal techniques, and it was essential in development of Civil Law 
                                                          
3 The main classic scholar literature on this topic: G. VISMARA, Episcopalis audientia, 
l’attività, giurisdizionale del vescovo per la risoluzione delle controversie private tra laici nel 
diritto romano e nella storia del diritto italiano fino al secolo nono. Milano, Società editrice "Vita 
e pensiero", 1937; P. CASPERS, Der Güte- und Schiedsgedanke im kirchlichen 
Zivilgerichtsverfahren. Eine kirchenrechtliche Untersuchung über das Wesen der episcopalis 
audientia. Düsseldorf, Triltsch-Verlag, 1954; also see, A. PÉREZ VIVO, La “episcopalis 
audiencia” y el principio de equidad en Constantino. Univesidad de Alicante, 1984; M.R. 
CIMMA, L´Episcopalis audientia nelle constituzione imperiali da Costantino a Giustiniano. 
Giappichelli. Torino, 1989; J. HARRIES, Law and Empire in the Late Antiquity. Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 p. 191 and following. 
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in Europe through many new legal institutions and interpretations; for 
example, the legal concept of corporations and the marriage contract. Until 
the 11th century, as Harold Bergman explains, ius canonicum (canon law) 
was not regularly used, the term ius ecclesiasticum (ecclesiastical law) was 
referred to the imperial legislation governing the relationship with the 
Church4.  
After the Protestant Reformation, Protestant churches renounced to 
exercise the Church jurisdiction, and the Protestant rulers, as heads of 
their churches, established one secular jurisdiction for their kingdoms and 
states. Only in the Catholic kingdoms, like France, Spain or Portugal, the 
Ecclesiastical Courts remain ruled by Church authorities, sometimes as a 
hybrid procedural system like the Inquisition Tribunals, by which the 
Church ruled the process, but the civil authorities implemented and 
executed the court´s decision. 
The aftermath of the American and French Revolutions and 
Napoleon´s military expansion forced the growth and development of a 
new paradigm, the secular paradigm, based on the establishment of the 
Constitutional rule of law and the state territorial jurisdiction; by which 
the nation-state, not the Church, is the only source of power entitled to 
exercise legislative and judiciary powers. As a result, ecclesiastical 
tribunals were not any longer part of country´s judiciary system. 
However, in the most of European Catholic countries, dual jurisdictions 
remained in place until almost the end of the 20th century, but only 
regarding canonical marriage celebrations and annulments or dissolutions 
of the bond.  
In the majority of traditional Catholic countries, their enacted 
Constitutions do not recognize Catholicism as the official religion of the 
state any longer, embracing the secular state constitutional frame but 
allowing cooperation with religious entities by legal agreements. The 
agreements with the Holy See, in four countries of the European Union5 
(Spain6, Italy7, Portugal and Malta), facilitate a link between both 
                                                          
4 H.J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. 
Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 202. 
5 E. CADELO DE ISLA, La eficacia civil de las sentencias canónicas de nulidad matrimonial 
en la Union Europea. El Reglamento 2201/2003. Thesis ad Doctorandum in Iure Canonico. 
Romae, 2005 (http://bibliotecanonica.net/docsaa/btcaat.htm). 
6 M. CUBILLAS RECIO, El sistema matrimonial español y la cláusula de ajuste al derecho 
del Estado. Universidad de Valladolid, 1985; J. FERRER ORTIZ, “La eficacia civil del 
matrimonio canónico y las decisiones eclesiásticas en el derecho español”. Ius et Praxis, 
14/2, 2008 (http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-00122008000200001 
1). 
 7 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 34 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
jurisdictions, secular and Catholic, by a new legal technique: the 
Homologation Clause. It is applicable to nullities and annulments of 
marriage. After the Catholic Court communicates their final decision to 
the parties, they are entitled to request to the civil family judge 
implementing the nullity and/or the annulment in the secular jurisdiction. 
It is a quick and easy civil procedure of adjustment by homologating 
Canon Law court decisions into the Civil Family Law, if the canonical 
causes for the nullity and/or the annulment legally fit into the civil ones. It 
is a system that, substantially, has been working well for several decades 
in those countries rooted in the Catholic tradition, balancing at the same 
time the individual right of religious freedom as a constitutional 
fundamental right. It means also, that Canon Law marriage regulations 
and procedures cannot be imposed on Catholics as an exclusive marriage 
jurisdiction in those countries, only as an optional procedure that can be 
initiated by the parties. It is a personal system different from family 
religious arbitrations and it is not applicable to prenuptial agreements, 
custody to children, or wills. 
 
 
2.2 - The Development of Secular and Religious Jurisdictions: from the 
Leges Barbarorum et Romanorum under the Principle of Personality to 
Medieval Dual Jurisdiction in Europe 
 
Today´s world is universally under the principle of territoriality of law, as 
the dominant legal system, reinforced by the expansion of the nation-state 
as political entity and identity under the nationalist ideologies developed 
since the 19th century. However, the Antiquity is characterized by the 
existence of communities, or nationes, without a land, and territories 
without states. For this reason, the principle of personality of law was the 
dominant one, and communities live under their traditional customs and 
laws. As a result, legal and jurisdictional pluralism8 was deeply rooted in 
the communities, existing diverse types of judicial institutions from 
informal to official courts. As Uriel Simonsohn shows, legal pluralism 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 L.P. COMOGLIO, “Delibazione di sentenze ecclesiastiche e ordine pubblico 
flessibile”. Jus-online n. 2, 2015 (www.unav.edu/.../33767_Comoglio_J2015_Delibazione.pdf). 
8 For the sociological concept and the paradigm of legal pluralism, see J. GRIFFITHS, 
"What is Legal Pluralism?", Journal of Legal Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), pp. 1-55; S.E. 
MERRY, “Legal Pluralism”, Law & Society Review 22/5 (1988), pp. 869-896. 
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exists across a number of legal orders as well as within a single legal 
order9. 
The principle of personality of law was expanded under the Roman 
ius gentium (laws of peoples) as a legal practice using ius natural (natural 
law), as a reasoning technique, allowing legal interaction among peoples 
from different cultures. The Roman jurist Gaius (130-180 AD) masterfully 
described it:  
 
“Every people that are governed by statutes and customs observe 
partly its own peculiar law and partly the law common to all 
mankind. That law, which a community establishes for itself, is 
peculiar to it, and is called ius civile as being the special law of that 
state, while the law that natural reason establishes among all 
mankind is followed by all peoples alike, and is called ius gentium as 
being the law observed by all mankind”10. 
 
The decline of the Western Roman Empire and the rise of Germanic 
kingdoms during the Late Antiquity were extremely difficult, insecure, 
violent, and disturbing times. The civilized and refined Romans were 
often brutally submitted to the uncultivated and cruel Barbarians, in a 
time known as the vulgarization era, when the Western Roman 
civilization collapsed. It was the encounter of peoples with different stages 
in civilization. Romans and Barbarians were culturally very different, even 
in their Christians backgrounds; Romans followed the Nicean Trinitarian 
creed, and Barbarians were Arians; most of Roman elites considered 
Arianism a dangerous heresy. Besides, the Roman Empire had a highly 
sophisticated legal system when Barbarians laws were just tribal customs. 
Initially, the only way to survive in both communities was just by a strict 
separation between them. Legally speaking, it was applying the principle 
of personality of law. By this principle, Romans kept their laws in practice 
without submitting themselves to the Barbarians new rulers´ laws. 
In the Antiquity, law and religion were personal belongings 
establishing a permanent link with their tribal or communitarian identity, 
or nation, in which territory had no bonds. Even during the hegemony of 
                                                          
9 U.I. SIMONSOHN, A Common Justice. The Legal Allegiances of Christians and Jews 
Under Early Islam. Pennsylvania University Press, 2011, pp. 25-40. 
10 Gai Institutiones or Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius, with a Translation and 
Commentary by Edward Poste, 4th ed. revised and enlarged by E.A. Whittuck, with an 
historical introduction by A.H.J. Greenidge. Oxford, 1904, 1 (More on this topic 
http://www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/law-of-nations). 
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the Roman Empire, Roman Law was a personal law attached to the 
Roman citizenship, the foreigners, pellegrini, were excluded11.  
As Simeon Guterman explains, the initial establishment of 
Germanic kingdoms as territorial domains in the Italic and Hispanic 
Peninsulas and North Africa reduced the law of the Roman population to 
the status of a tolerated personal legislation, but Germanic laws have 
territorial validity in disputes. Besides, the priority of Barbarians over 
Romans was clear in criminal cases. For example, the practice of blood 
money, as compensation for the killing of someone, known as wergeld in 
Germanic laws, had different rates according to the Salic Law, where the 
murder of a free Frank is assessed at 200 solidi (gold coins of Roman 
origin), and that of a Roman at 100 solidi12. During the first period of those 
kingdoms, as a general practice, mixed marriages were prohibited in order 
to control the cultural identities by the political and religious elites. 
However, Romans have access to official positions, in part because they 
were more educated, later even as members of the king´s council.  
Roman judges and tribunals decided on Roman cases and 
Germanic ones ruled over Germanic lawsuits. More complex it was in 
cases concerning both identities and conflict of laws. However, the Roman 
civil law was applied more often because its technical superiority 
facilitated the best legal solution. 
Progressively, as the population was more integrated became 
common mixed Barbarian and Roman courts; usually, the Romans judges 
were better resolving the conflicts in manners that were more professional. 
Civil Roman Law was the main source of evolution of Germanic laws, 
although Barbarians law still prevailed in criminal cases. In practice, most 
of the cases Roman judges resolved civil cases and Germanic judges 
decided over crimes; the laws of the victim were usually applied, not the 
laws of the perpetrator.  
The Germanic rulers in order to improve the legal territorial 
structure had to accept the superiority of Roman Law. Barbarian 
codifications of laws were enacted, following the example of the Justinian 
Code, Corpus Iuris Civilis, accelerating the process of accommodation and 
absorption of Roman praxis and Jurisprudence. This process helped to 
                                                          
11 S.L. GUTERMAN, “The Principle of the Law in the Early Middle Ages: A Chapter 
in the Evolution of Western Legal Institutions and Ideas” Univ. Miami Law Rev. 21 (1968), 
p. 272 (Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol21/iss2/1). 
12 S.L. GUTERMAN, “The Principle of the Law in the Early Middle Ages”, cit., pp. 
263 and 267. 
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level the legal status between Romans and Barbarians. As Guterman 
indicates,  
 
"in Visigothic Spain, the personal law regime came to an end at the 
time that the Frankish system was being built up. Recceswinth (c. 
654) forbade the use of laws other than the official Visigothic Code. 
Marriages between Romans and Visigoths were now permitted and 
the old interdict of the Roman law against such marriages was 
abrogated"13.  
 
As a rule, in mixed marriages, the wife followed the husband´s 
personal law. However, there were exceptions. 
One of the latest Germanic territorial occupations was on the Italic 
Peninsula by the Lombards or Longobards in the 6th century. Probably, 
according to several sources, it was very violent, the Romans were 
dispossessed of their properties and lands, and their laws abolished except 
in the city of Rome, in which the Justinian laws survived14. One century 
later, during the ruling of Liutprand (712-744) his Catholicism and his 
legislation promoted the beginning of the integration process between 
Romans and Lombards. Particularly after the Donation of Sutri (728), 
when Liutprand and Pope Gregory II finally agree, and the Lombards 
returned to the Papacy the territories that belong by donations to the 
Church before the Lombard conquest, allowing the development of the 
Papal States. 
Vulgar Latin and the acceptance of the Catholic faith by the 
Barbarians, abandoning their own Arianism, facilitated enormously the 
process of integration of Roman and Germanic identities. After the 
abrogation prohibiting of mixed marriages, the new blending families 
improved definitely the integration process between Barbarians and 
Romans and their names were romanized to Vulgar Latin. 
The Catholic Church was subject to Roman Law as well as the 
hierarchy and clergy. After the Germanic kingdoms became officially 
Catholics, the clergy hold progressively privileges and immunities, 
privilegium fori. Simultaneously, the hierarchy developed an active and 
independent jurisdiction, in part reinforced by the Episcopalis Audiencia 
recovering the legacy of the Church´s jurisdiction under the Christian 
Roman Empire. In addition, the Catholic cergy expanded their political 
power by the councils of the kingdom. Some examples are, the Councils of 
                                                          
13 S.L. GUTERMAN, “The Principle of the Law in the Early Middle Ages”, cit., p. 290. 
14 F. GREGOROVIUS, History of the city of Rome in the Middle Ages, vol. 3, English 
version. London, 1895, p. 60.  
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Orleans in the Frankish Kingdom, and the Councils of Toledo in the 
Visigothic Kingdom. 
The recognition of the freedom of choice of law seems to be applied 
by Liutprand in exceptional cases; after 9th century, the Carolingian 
Emperor Lothar I (Holy Roman Emperor, 817-855), gave to the people of 
the city of Rome the right to choose what law they wished to be applied, 
Roman or Barbarian15. 
The expansion of the Frankish kingdom under Charlemagne (Holy 
Roman Emperor, 800-814) and his dynasty transformed the Frankish 
kingdom into an empire and the dualistic system - Barbarian and Roman - 
was replaced by the dominance of the principle of territoriality; as 
consequence, the due process was gradually established in the secular 
sphere as part of the imperial or royal judiciary system. 
Simultaneously, the legal system of the Church, attached to the 
legal Roman legacy, developed her own legal system, Canon Law, as a 
tool for achieving bigger independence from the imperial and royal 
powers. Since the 11th century, both legal systems coexist in the Catholic 
Europe as dual jurisdiction, secular and religious, channeling the 
formation of the Western Legal Tradition.  
The Church jurisdiction was developed from the principle of 
personality establishing its own boundaries as a personal jurisdiction, 
known as privilegium fori, and it was exercised over clergy and members of 
their household, students, Crusaders, pitiful persons as widows and 
orphans, Jews in cases against Christians, and travelers16. However, it was 
not a clear and peaceful separation of between secular and church 
jurisdictions, secular rulers were constantly trying to limit the 
jurisdictional space of the Church, while she was trying to expand it. Some 
of the biggest confrontations in the middle ages between popes or bishops 
and emperors or kings took place because of the struggle imposing their 
own jurisdictions in order to strengthen their own political power.  
The Church´s jurisdiction was widely extended when the structural 
system of Canon Law was progressively reinforced through the papal 
authority, particularly as a result the pope´s leadership over the 
Christendom during the Crusades' era, and by the increasing of pope´s 
legislative activity after Pope Gregory IX enacted his Decretals in 1234. 
Therefore, the Catholic Church detached herself from the imperial 
power creating five types of jurisdictions. As Harold Berman details17: 1) 
                                                          
15 S.L. GUTERMAN, “The Principle of the Law in the Early Middle Ages”, cit., p. 304. 
16 H.J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution,, cit., p. 222. 
17 H.J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, cit., p. 225. 
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out of the Church´s jurisdiction over the sacraments, took control over 
marriage celebrations, annulments, and dissolutions; 2) out of the 
Church´s jurisdiction over benefices, developed a full body of property 
laws; 3) out of the Church´s jurisdiction over wills, elaborated a well 
crafted legal rules of inheritance; 4) out of the Church´s jurisdiction over 
oaths, built up rules of contracts; 5) out of the Church´s jurisdiction over 
sins, created procedures and tribunals over crimes and torts. 
Simultaneously, the secular jurisdiction was multiplied in different 
legal spheres of power: imperial, royal, feudal, manorial, mercantile and 
urban18. As the society became more urban than rural and trade´s rules 
more sophisticated, secular legal structures developed new institutions 
and laws, most of them based on Canon Law legal innovations. Religious 
and secular jurisdictions competed for expanding their domains, and 
rivalry and antagonism stimulated the development of both juridical 
systems. At the same time, the conflicts between both jurisdictions became 
multiplied. There was not a clear division of jurisdictions and both 
claimed the right of exclusive jurisdiction; although the development of 
some accommodation practices in court praxis and rules of compromise 
reduced those conflicts. However, the dilemma over the dual sovereignty 
remained without a clear solution or consolidated practices of 
harmonization19.  
The violent contest between popes and emperors for universal 
jurisdiction and supremacy eroded both institutions of power. Moreover, 
since the 13th century the pope´s supremacy and the ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction is challenged by strong critical doctrinal currents like 
Marsilians, Wycliffites, and Hussites in favor of the legal submission of the 




2.3 - Religious Minorities under Christian Rulers 
 
                                                          
18 H.J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, cit.p. 274. 
19 Particularly, regarding to the conflicts between Canon Law and English Common 
Law see, W.R. JONES, “Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in 
England during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries”, Studies in Medieval and 
Renaissance History 7 (1970), pp. 79-210; R.H. HELMHOLZ, "Conflicts between Religious 
and Secular Law: Common Themes in the English Experience, 1250-1640", Cardozo Law 
Review 12 (1991), pp. 707-728. 
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Pre-Christian Roman Civil Law had a basic distinction between Romans 
citizens and non-Romans (peregrini), regardless their communal and 
religious identity. Antonine Constitution in 212 expanded the Roman 
citizenship to all subjects of the Empire recognizing multiple cultural 
identities under the Roman citizenship; Jews were among those sub-
identities having their own traditional legal system, known as Lex Iudaica 
or Ius Iudaicum. Besides the Roman legal order, applicable to all Roman 
citizens, plural jurisdictions remained in place alongside the Roman laws; 
civil arbitration under their own legal rules and courts was allowed, if 
both parts were agreed. Nevertheless, in litigations between citizens from 
different cultural communities, Roman law was applied. 
However, as result of the violent clashes between Jews and Christians 
since the 1st century, both communities enacted many laws establishing a 
strict separation between them, in order to facilitate a peaceful coexistence. 
After the 4th century, Imperial Ecclesiastical Law and Canon Law 
developed a very restrictive body of Jewry Laws, as Christian legislation 
regarding the Jews. Justinian laws in the 6th century were particularly 
harsh on the Jews and the so-called heretics. As a result, many 
prohibitions were enacted on them; for example, they were not allowed to 
have access to public office positions, to teach, to testify against Christians 
or to have curial privileges20. Simultaneously, segregation of religious 
communities was reinforced by many laws; for example, mixed marriages 
were prohibited in Jewish and Christian legislations, even under death 
penalty, although it is not possible to know precisely if those written rules 
were implemented or not.  
Under the Barbarian rule, Jews had limited rights and the paradigm 
of separation or segregation was prevailing. The principle of personality 
was also maintained and non-Romans were under their own personal or 
local laws and customs. Jews were under the authority and jurisdiction of 
the magister iudeorum (magistrate of the Jews). 
For example, Visigothic rulers initially applied the Lex Romana 
Visighotorum, or Breviary of Alaric (506), based on the anti-Jewish Roman 
legislation from the Theodosius code (437); after the conversion of King 
Reccared I to the Catholic faith in 587, ecclesiastic laws were progressively 
more oppressive towards non-Catholics, mainly the heretics - particularly 
the Arians - and the Jews. The III Council of Toledo (589), the first held 
                                                          
20 R.W. MATHISEN, “The Citizenship and Legal Status of the Jews in Roman Law 
during Late Antiquity”. J. Tolan, N. de Lange, L. Foschia, C. Nemo-Pekelman (eds.), Jews 
in Early Christian Law: Byzantium and the Latin West, 6th - 11th centuries. Brepols Publ., 2014, 
pp. 35-54. 
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under a Catholic Visigoth kingdom, ordered to baptize the children of 
unions between a Jewish man and a Christian woman. More repressive 
anti-Jewish policies and legislation was enacted by king Sisebut in the first 
decade of the 7th century, and endorsed by the canon 10 of the III Council 
of Seville (624), forcing conversions of all Jews21. Although later, the IV 
Council of Toledo (633) reversed the imposition of forced conversions, did 
not lift the death penalty for apostasy if the baptized Jews, even if they 
were baptized by force, returned to Jewish practices. Nonetheless, this 
Council enacted several anti-Jews canons: depriving Jews of their 
properties and expelling them from the Visigoth realm. This policy was 
reinforced by the VII and the XII councils22; a full policy of eradication of 
Jews was implemented by Reccesvinth (653-672) and later by his grandson 
Erwig (680-687)23.  
In the Byzantine Empire, there are also examples of massive forced 
conversions of Jews by imperial decrees, as under Emperors Heraclius 
(630), Leo III (721) and Basil I (873)24 enacted as a strategy to unify the 
Empire under the Christian identity. 
In the case of Muslims under Canon Law, between 7th to 11th 
centuries - as David M. Freidenreich, explains - it is not always evident 
that any given statement about non-Christians in Canon law refers 
specifically to Muslims. In addition to using such terms as “Saracens‟, 
“Hagarenes”, and “Arabs”, Christian authorities regularly refer to 
Muslims as “pagans”, “gentiles”, and “barbarians”25. There is also 
                                                          
21 R.L. STOCKING, «Forced Converts, ´Crypto-Judaism´ and Children: Religious 
Identification in Visigothic Spain». Ibid., pp. 243-266. Regarding the canon 10 of the III 
Council of Seville, see ft. 12.  
Regarding forced conversion in the Gratian´s Decretum and in the Decretists, see K. 
PENNINGTON, “Gratian and the Jews”, Bull. Medieval Canon Law 31 (2014). (Access to 
CUA Scholarship Repository: http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1903&co 
ntext=scholar). 
22 In the 12th Council of Toledo 28 laws were enacted against Jews under the Title VIIII. 
DE CONFIRMATIONE LEGUM QUAE IN IUDEORUM NEQUITIA PROMULGATE 
SUNT. ||fol. 105vb|. (Internet access in http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/ chga_05 
5t.htm). 
23 R. GONZALEZ SALINERO, “Una élite indeseable: los potentiores judíos de la 
España visigoda”. El mundo judío en la Península Ibérica: sociedad y economía. Aldebarán, 
Cuenca, 2012, pp. 5-17. 
24 O. PRIETO DOMINGUEZ, “The Mass Conversions of the Jews Decreed by 
Emperor Basil I in 873-4”. Jews in Early Christian Law: Byzantium and the Latin West, 6th - 
11th centuries, cit., pp. 283-310. 
25 D.M. FREIDENREICH, "Muslims in Canon Law, 650-1000". Christian-Muslim 
Relations. A Bibliographical History. Volume 1 (600-900). Brill, 2009, pp. 83-98. 
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important to keep in mind the distinction between Islamic Law from 
Saracen Law. The late term is applied by the Christians, from early 
medieval times, and by the 19th century´s Orientalists, mostly in a 
derogatory narrative style26. 
 
 
3 - Muslim Legal Tradition of Plural Jurisdiction 
 
The Arab expansion from the borderlands of the Arabian Peninsula 
toward the Sassanian and the Eastern Roman Empire - as the Barbarian 
expansion did in the Western Roman Empire - created new dynamics 
from quiet settlements to violent clashes between outsiders and locals, 
channeling the later success of Islam as a new religious monotheistic 
paradigm.  
Islam, aside from stereotyped and narrowed interpretations and 
defensive narratives, was the result of an Arabization of the Abrahamic 
legacy and probably an effect but not the cause27 of a long period of wars, 
rebellions, migrations, political instability and uncertainty in the 
borderland between the Roman-Byzantine Empire and the Persian-
Sassanian Empire clashing with each other for almost seven hundred 
years.  
The Pre-Muslim Arab tribes and states, like the Barbarians, were 
often at the service of both empires under the rules of clientelism, 
developing gradually new religious, social, cultural, and political models 
shaping proto-Islam in many different ways. Mystery religions, 
Gnosticism, Messianic, Prophetic and holy book traditions, Mazdeism, 
Judaism, Judeo-Christianities and different heterodox Christian 
communities living in the desert, and distant from orthodoxies 
implemented by Imperial powers, nourished the emergence of multiple 
cultural, political, and religious identities converging under the umbrella 
of Islam. 
Later, the interaction among Muslim and Christian kingdoms and 
empires brought new political struggles and military clashes, but also 
crucial cultural encounters and economic exchanges in the Medieval and 
                                                          
26 For a complete analysis see J.V. TOLAN, Saracens. Islam in the European Medieval 
Imagination. Columbia University Press, 2002. 
27 See in detailed, E. GONZÁLEZ FERRÍN, La Angustia de Abraham. Los orígenes 
culturales del islam. Almuzara, 2013, p. 8 y ss. Also see “Islamic Late Antiquity and Fath: 
the effect as cause”. Nangueroni Meeting, Milan, 2015 (Digital access 
https://www.academia.edu/12634825/Islamic_Late_Antiquity_and_Fath_-_the_Effect_as_Cause).  
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the Modern eras. The dynamics of Muslim identities -from the Berber, the 
Arab, the Moor, the Persian, the Indian, and the Turk legacies- facilitated 
the emergence of Muslim empires, as the Umayyad, the Almohad, the 
Almoravid, the Abbasid, the Safavid, the Mughal and the Ottoman, as 
main examples. Those empires created a rich and diverse cultural space, 
often breeding from the very same Hellenism as the Christian kingdoms 
and empires, but creating their own Islamic identities. 
The Islamic legal tradition is based on the Fiqh, the jurisprudential 
interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an, as revealed divine law, and the 
Sunna, as the teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad. Among 
those practices, mediation and arbitration in disputes were also 
established as the legacy from Bedouin tribal customs in Arabia known as 
Sulha, linked to the notion of musalaha as reconciliation. Prophet 
Muhammad himself was a Takhim, arbitrator, before and after the 
founding of Islam28. The Qur´an ((49:9; 4:35/58) and the Sunna encourage 
the reconciliation between Muslim parties in conflict. 
During the Islamic Golden Age (8th to 13th centuries) legal schools 
implemented analogical reasoning, qiyas, and juridical consensus, ijma, as 
methodologies of interpretation, ijtihad; the legal schools developed 
different interpretations in arbitration as well, even between Muslims and 
non-Muslims29. Through this era, new legal institutions and analysis were 
explored in innovative ways. Some of them resemble legal institutions 
implemented by the European and English Common Law traditions, 
offering remarkable similarities30. Previously, the Roman law also had 
some influence in the political and civil structures under the Muslim rule, 
mainly in the former territories of the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium; 
for example, compiling collections of laws in Byzantine style during the 
Abbasid dynasty. Even it has been detected some parallelisms between the 
legal work of one of the founders of the Hanafi school, al-Shaybānī 
(749/750-805), and the Justinian Code31. Later, the relationship between 
                                                          
28 D. PELY, Muslim/Arab Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Routledge, 2016. Chapter 1: 
Sulha in Muslim Jurisprudence an Customary Justice. Particularly footnotes 3-4. See also, 
A. RAMAHI, “Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration”. London School of Economics 
and Political Science Law Department. Working Papers 12/2008, pp. 10-13 (Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=[1153659]). 
29 A. RAMAHI, “Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration”, cit., p. 15. 
30 For a general analysis and legal literature see R. POTZ, Islamic Law and the Transfer 
of European Law, in European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European 
History (IEG), Mainz 2011-11-21 (URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/potzr-2011-en). 
31 B. JOKISCH, Islamic Imperial Law: Harun al-Rashid's Codification Project, Walter De 
Gruyte, Berlin 2007.  
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Islamic and European medieval legal practices and norms could be traced 
among the Muslim world and the Crusaders states, Sicily, Spaniard 
Christian kingdoms, and the Italian city-states. 
 
 
3.1 - Muslim Empires and the Dhimma System 
 
The paradigm of legal separation between Muslims and non-Muslims 
prevailed in the early Muslim Emirates and empires, as it did in the early 
Germanic kingdoms between Romans and Barbarians and later between 
Catholics and non-Catholics. Nevertheless, the outcome process was 
different, because the Arabization and Islamization of the locals took place 
at huge scale; the Barbarians, on the contrary, were romanized and 
progressively abandoned their Arian faith becoming Catholics as the local 
Romans, channeling the integration process by assimilation the Roman 
heritage. This was a blending process along the 12th century, in which took 
place the cultural transition from Romanesque to Gothic art, as an 
expression of a new urban society in Europe that was born from the 
synthesis of Roman and Germanic legacies.  
One of the biggest challenges of the Muslim rulers was to elaborate 
regulations over non-Muslims; as it was for the Barbarians initially Arians 
and later Catholics32. The Islamic legal solution was more tolerant than the 
Visigoth policies particularly on the Jews; it was based on the 
development of the notion of dhimmi, as protected non-Muslim but not 
legally equal to Muslims, from the exegetical interpretation of Verse 9:29 
from the Qur’an33.  
Dhimmis were enforced to pay a tax (jizya,) but at the same time, 
they were released from Muslim duties. Legally speaking, it was a 
compulsory membership applicable to the religious communities with a 
“Sacred Text”. Most of the schools of Jurisprudence Sunnis and Shias 
include as dhimmis: Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. Aside from the 
scholar debate about its origins linked to the Covenant of Omar, as 
                                                          
32 For a comparative analysis see the collective work: Religious Minorities in Christian, 
Jewish and Muslim Law (5th -15th centuries). (Edited by Nora Berend, Youna Hameau-
Masset, Capucine Nemo-Pekelman and John Tolan) Brepols Publ., 2017. 
33 M. ABDEL-HALEEM, “The jizya Verse (Q. 9:29) Tax Enforcement on Non-Muslims 
in the First Muslim State”. Journal of Qur'anic Studies, 14/2 (2012) pp. 72-89.  
For a critical legal analysis see about the dhimma system see: A.M. EMON, Religious 
Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law. Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
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apocryphal or non-spurious text, the heritage of this pact contributed to 
the interaction pattern with non-Muslims through the dhimma legal 
tradition. 
It was a unified model of accommodation for religious minorities. 
Muslim Law did not distinguish between Jews and Christians, and those 
regulations were, in general, less oppressive than the Byzantine and 
Visigoth anti-Jewish legislation, as a principle forced conversions were not 
imposed according the verse of Qur'an non compulsion in religion ( Q. 
2:256). However, episodes of forced conversions have been recorded, like 
those that took place in the Christian kingdoms. Here are some examples: 
during the wars of Ridda (632-633) or wars of Apostasy, under the 
military campaigns of Abu Bakr; later, in 12th century under the Almohad 
rule; or in the Ottoman era, under the devshirme practice collecting 
Christian boys from Anatolia and the Balkans as a tax of blood, forcing 
them to convert to Islam and training them to be Janissaries; and under the 
Safavid dynasty in Persia, forcing conversion of Sunnis to Twelver Shism. 
In the 9th and 10th centuries, more degrading restrictions were 
imposed on the Jews and Christians, many of them in clear parallelism 
with the Byzantine Jewry legislation. In the Medieval Muslim world, the 
most common restrictions for Christians and Jews were the following: 
forced to wear distinctive clothes or badges, restrictions in jobs and 
government positions, use of riding animals, prohibition of building new 
churches or synagogues34. Many of those rules were included as a part of 
the so-called Covenant of Omar35. However, there were many differences 
among Muslim territories, depending on geographical locations, the 
rulers, schools of jurisprudence, and different theological divisions in 
Islam; as a result, there was a wide variety of adaptations of the dhimma 
system36.  
This system, basically, ensured that non-Muslims must be separate 
and subordinate to the Muslim rule, preventing any religious 
contamination of Islam from non-Muslim religious beliefs; but this 
structure also reinforced the identity of those religious communities under 
their own leaders, who imposed their regulations favoring a strict formal 
                                                          
34 Further analysis in S.D. GOITIEN, Jews and Arabs: A Concise History of Their Social 
and Cultural Relations. Chapter 3. (New York, 1955) Dover Publications, last ed. 2005. 
35 See the prohibitions and regulations in one of the well-known texts of the Treaty of 
Omar in: https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/pact-umar.asp 
36 For an overview in the Islamic West, see the collective book The Legal Status of the 
Dimmi-s in the Islamic West. (Edit. by Maribel Fierro and John Nolan), Brepols, 2014 
(https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01079944). 
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separation to control their own communities. The separation was often 
spatial reinforced progressively by having Jewish and Christian quarters, 
sometimes by choice, others by imposition. This communal space 
facilitated the sense of identity of each religious group, but also the control 
of their leaders and elites over them. 
In the Iberian Peninsula, Jews under Muslim or Christian rule lived 
mostly in juderías and morerias, often isolated by walls and gates, in which 
Jewish communities, aljamas, had their own legal, fiscal and judicial 
systems applicable compulsory to Moors and Jews. 
The Muslim legal tradition was more flexible regarding to mixed 
marriages; on the contrary to the Christian legal tradition, allows Muslim 
men to marry non-Muslim women, if their religions have a sacred text.  
Religious minorities under the Muslim rule were able to have their 
own jurisdictional structures, mainly in civil cases, generally regarding 
Family law. Criminal offenses were usually held by Muslim judges, as the 
Barbarian courts did it. Similarly, in cases of civil conflicts between 
Muslims and non-Muslims were resolved by a Muslim judge. 
Under the legal space created by the dhimma system, legal pluralism 
was developed. In the former territories of the Eastern Roman Empire and 
the Sassanian Empire, the Islamic rule allowed the development of 
multiple institutions, formal and informal, and plural interpretations into 
a single Muslim order, adjusting the diversity and the dynamics of those 
cultural and religious identities; Uriel Simonsohn called it a “judicial 
bazaar”37.  
The Islamic legal system allowed the interaction between the 
principle of personality of the law and the principle of territoriality, and 
Muslim and non-Muslims could apply to the Sharia regarding to contract 
law, property law, family law, and in heredity litigations, even if both 
parties were non-Muslim38.  
In Al-Andalus, the Jewish judges interpreted Talmudic law mainly 
according to the Babylonian School. Iberian Mozarabs had also their own 
tribunals and judges, named censors, applying Canon Law and the 
Visigothic Code enacted in 654 known as Liber Iudiciourum or Forum 
Iudicum. 
Following the interpretation of the Verses Q. 5:42 and Q. 5:49, some 
Muslim jurists were in favor to designate Islamic courts as optional place 
for arbitration between dhimmis; when others interpreted those verses as 
                                                          
37 U.I. SIMONSOHN, A Common Justice, cit., p. 63. 
38 N. Al-QATTAN, “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious 
Discrimination”. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 31 (1999) pp. 429-444. 
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the primacy of the Islamic jurisdiction over dhimmis legal controversies39. 
There is an ongoing scholar debate about how rigid was in practice such a 
separation, and which were the dynamics of the Islamic paradigm of 
autonomy. Uriel Simonsohn suggests that this paradigm should be 
revisited40 taking into account that those regulations were sporadically 
enforced, and often the religious leaders of those communities demanded 
the intervention of Muslim authorities when it was convenient. In his 
view, the symbolic separation allowed them to maintain a discourse of 
resistance, having their own place and identity41. Indeed, it was also an 
effective way to maintain the power of the religious elites over their own 
communities.  
According to Goitein and Glick, Jews became more acculturated, 
not assimilated, in the Muslim domains than in the Christian territories, 
because under the Islamic rule there was more secular cultural space for 
scholar studies and sciences; as a result, Jews in the Islamic world, were 
completely Arabized by the 11th century42.  
Al-Andalus was certainly a cultural mosaic of religious identities; 
the Muslim identity was not homogeneous, Berbers, Arabs, and mainly 
Iberian Neo-Muslims created new social dynamics shaping the 
Andalusian Moorish identity. Progressively, the last ones were 
incorporated to the ruling elites during the Caliphate, and throughout the 
Taifa period. 
However, in Al-Andalus and Maghreb the secular cultural space, 
shared by Muslim, Jews, and Mozarabs, changed drastically when the 
Almoravid and Almohad violent expansions took place, from the 11th to 
13th centuries, creating two successive Berber militarized empires 
imposing restrictive measures over the population, mainly over Jews and 
Mozarabs. Many Muslims, Jews, and Christian seek out refuge in 
Christian lands or other Muslim territories. Probably from that time is 
developed the narrative distinguishing Moor (moro), as Muslim 
Andalusian speaking Arab, and Christian, from the northern Iberian 
kingdoms, speaking Romance languages; Jews and Mozarabs often were 
holding positions of power, as Diwan members, viziers, and ambassadors. 
As Thomas Glick explains, in the 11th century Jews were a counterbalance 
between Berbers dynasties and the Arab elites; Jews managed the fiscal 
                                                          
39 U.I. SIMONSOHN, A Common Justice, cit., p. 6. 
40 U.I. SIMONSOHN, A Common Justice, cit., pp. 6-10. 
41 U.I. SIMONSOHN, A Common Justice, cit., p. 9. 
42 For further readings S.D. GOITIEN, Jews and Arabs: Their Contact Through the Ages, 
cit.; T.F. GLICK, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages. Brill, 2005. 
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and the administrative structure, while the social order was imposed by 
the Berber militia43. 
The next two examples show the flexibility adjusting the dhimma 
tradition by different Muslim Imperial models in two different eras: by 
Medieval Muslim dynasties in Egypt, and by the pre-Modern Turkish 
Ottoman Empire.  
The status of dhimmis under Medieval Muslim dynasties in Egypt -
Famities, Ayyubids, and Mamluks -, as it is verified by the extensive 
documentation of those periods, was not too restrictive allowing them to 
interact with the Muslim institutions and authorities in many legal ways 
beyond the limits of Sharia´s frame. As Marina Rustov proves44, the 
petition-and-response procedure provided evidence that invoking 
precedent, law, and justice; Muslims and dhimmis were subject to similar 
treatment by the state in the Mazalim courts (administrative courts in 
which the subjects can apply to their rulers in cases of abuse of power by 
other authorities), but it does not mean that they were equal in torts or in 
court procedure.  
The second example is the Ottoman Millet system45, rooted in the 
dhimma legal tradition. It was the framework used by the Ottoman Turks 
to interact with their religious minorities; it was build up gradually and 
institutionalized by Mehmet II in 1453.  
Each millet, or religious community, was entitled to have its own 
authority, legal system, and jurisdiction. The three main millets were the 
Rum (Orthodox Greek Christians under the Patriarch of Constantinople), 
the Armenian (not subjects to the Orthodox Patriarch but having their 
own Patriarch of Constantinople, as authority erected in the Ottoman era) 
                                                          
43 For a detailed analysis see, T.F. GLICK, Islamic and Christian Spain, cit., Chapter 5. 
44 M. RUSTOV, “The Legal Status of Dimmi-s in the Fatimid East: A view from the 
Palace in Cairo”. The Legal Status of the Dimmi-s in the Islamic West, Brepols, 2013 pp. 305-
332, particularly p. 326.  
45 Further readings: B. BRAUDE, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System", Christians 
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society - Vol. 1. (Ed.B. Braude & 
B. Lewis). New York, 1982, re-ed. B. Braude, 2014, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 65-86. E. 
CEYLAN, "The Millet System in the Ottoman Empire”, New Millennium Perspectives in the 
Humanities. (Ed., by Judith Urton-Ward) Fatih University, Brigham Young University, 
2002, pp. 244-265. Y. BOR, “Millet System in Ottoman Empire: An Extraordinary Policy 
with Extraordinary Implications” (https://www.academia.edu/7521006/Millet_system_in_Otto 
man_Empire). A. CHABOU, Treatment of Religious Minorities under the Ottoman Millet 
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and the Jews46 (under the authority of the Chief Rabbi, Hakham Bashi). It is 
important also to remember that arbitration was extensively used by the 
Ottomans, following the Hanafi interpretation in favor of a contractual 
nature of the arbitration; the first codification of Sharia, the Medjella, 
dedicates a complete section to arbitration47. 
The Muslims under the Ottoman Empire did not have a Millet 
system. This model - as the dhimma system itself - was developed to 
maintain the segregation among the religious minorities under certain 
degree of jurisdictional autonomy, and to prevent any contamination of 
the Islamic beliefs and assimilation to the Muslim identity. At the same 
time, the Millet system established a structure of control exercised 
simultaneously by the Muslim authorities and by the religious and civil 
leaders of those religious minorities. 
 
 
3.2 - Islamic Communities in Transition: from the Pre-colonial era to the 
Colonial Rule 
 
The classical Sharia was mainly a jurisprudential law in a constant process 
of creation by interpretation, and the legal opinions (fatwas) were issued 
by authoritative jurists; then, those opinions were compiled as textbooks, 
in a similar way that the Digest (Pandectae) of Justinian in Roman Law, or 
like the Decretum of Gratian in Medieval Canon Law. A proper appeal 
procedure did not exist, although the Mazalim courts could play in part 
that role mainly in criminal cases.  
The Western Legal systems - European continental and English 
Common Law - had a deep impact in the Muslim empires and realms 
worldwide, when they became in contact during the Modern colonial era. 
Particularly, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, and France altered 
substantially the Muslim legal systems when a small number of European 
colonizers ruled over a large Muslim population. 
                                                          
46 Additional readings, S.J. SHAW, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic. New York University Press, 1991. Coll. work, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (Ed. 
by Avigdor Levy), Princeton, Darwin Press, 1994. Further analysis on Syria, Tunisia, 
Tripolitania, Morocco, Yemen, and Iran in the collective work, Jews among Muslims. 
Communities in the Pre-colonial Middle East (Ed. by Shlomo Deshen and Walter P. Zenner), 
New York University Press, 1996; R. POTZ, “Islamic Law and the Transfer to European 
Law”. European History Online (EGO), Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2011 
(Available at: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/potzr-2011-en). 
47 A. RAMAHI, “Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration”, cit., pp. 16-17. 
 23 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 34 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
Under the colonial rule, the minority of foreigners ruled over the 
majority of locals, as in the Barbarian era, creating new dynamics and 
conflicts in those communities, and reshaping the principle of personality 
of the law. 
The colonizers had their own legal system from their metropolis, 
and the local Muslims were under the Sharia. As Jun Akiba indicates, 
colonial empires incorporate the Islamic Legal system into the 
governmental and administrative institutions, assuming the role as 
guardians in the enforcement of the Sharia, and provoking a profound 
transformation of its nature48.  
This new frame created legal changes and contradictions 
(antinomies) that had to be addressed. As a result, the Muslim legal 
tradition became significantly modified by the colonizers´ legal systems. 
Here are some examples: the creation of courts of appeals; the 
introduction of the case-law system and the principle of the precedent 
following the English legal tradition, or the process of codification 
according to the European continental Legal tradition. Also, the criminal 
system was softened restricting or abolishing physical punishments. 
One of the biggest changes was the simplification of the Muslim 
legal system, standardizing the rules of interpretation; as consequence, the 
Sharia lost its traditional jurisprudential flexibility49. 
In the most Muslim territories submitted to the French colonizers, 
the Islamic jurisdiction became progressively reduced and replaced by 
French legislation except in Family Law. 
In Algeria, as an example of French colonial policies, property and 
land laws changed to encourage the arrival of French settlers or colonists. 
A major legal transformation took place in the middle of 19th century 
when French authorities intervened in the administration of the Muslim 
courts in a process of institutionalization and bureaucratization, in order 
to control and limit its authority over the Muslim population. Initially, it 
was imposed French civil appeals courts and later the ulama was 
accommodated in those courts, including in each of them three French 
magistrates and two Muslim associate judges (asseseurs).  
At the same time, it was created the Conseil Supérieur de Droit 
Musulman, composed of five Muslim jurisconsults as a consulting body 
on Islamic law; although in 1875, the Council was abolished, and in 1889, 
                                                          
48 J. AKIBA, “Empires and Sharia: A Comparison of Colonial Islamic Legal Systems”. 
Eurasia´s Regional Powers Compared- China, India, Rusia. (Ed., by Shinichiro Tabata) 
Routledge, 2015, p. 171.  
49 J. AKIBA, “Empires and Sharia”, cit., pp. 171-172. 
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the Muslim judges were excluded from the courts of appeals. Cadis, 
muftis, and imams became civil servants of the French government, 
reinforcing the bureaucratization of the Muslim judicial system in a 
similar way that Catholic clergy was part of the administrative French 
structure50. The outcome of this process in Algeria under the French 
colonial powers was the development of the Algerian Muslim Law, 
mixing Islamic Maliki jurisprudence and French Law; according to Jun 
Akiba this blended Muslim law emphasized a more rigid and 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, in a similar way like in the Russian 
Empire and in the British Empire51. 
During the last quarter of the 19th century, waves of violence and 
unrest increased, demanding Muslim solidarity, opposition, and liberation 
from the colonial empires. The Muslim communities under the colonial 
rule developed a strong current of political pan-Islamism anti-colonialist. 
The colonizer´s empires reacted increasing the distrust with measures to 
weaken the ulamas´ authority. The outcome was that social and political 
wounds from the colonial period still are present in the most Muslim 
postcolonial states after the reciprocal mistrust was build up. 
The Ottoman Empire remained one of the few Muslim empires 
controlling its territories until the end of the IWW. However, the influence 
of the colonial ruling example and the Modern European legal systems, 
particularly the French model, channeled significant reforms in the 
Ottoman legal and administrative institutions starting in 1839. 
The Ilmiye, developed in the 16th century, was one of the four pillars 
of the Ottoman structure: imperial power, bureaucracy, military structure, 
and religious authority. The Ilmiye implemented the religious power and it 
was in charge of the protection of the Muslim faith, its proper education 
and the enforcement of the Sharia among the Muslim population. When 
the process of secularization was accelerated in the middle of the 19th 
century, the Ilmiye became an institution in crisis; in part, because religious 
non-Muslim minorities were not equally treated like the Muslims, 
                                                          
50 J. AKIBA, “Empires and Sharia”, cit., pp. 178-179. Further reading: Ch. 
MENNESSON, Organisation de la justice et du notariat musulmans en Algérie et législation 
applicable en Algérie aux musulmans. Challamel et C. Éditeurs, París, 1888; A. 
CHRISTELOW, Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria, Princeton 
University Press, 1985; C. COLLOT, Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale 
(1830-1962), C.N.R.S., Paris, 1987. 
51 J. AKIBA, “Empires and Sharia”, cit., p. 179. 
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embracing nationalist ideologies52 and demanding full sovereignty in the 
territories of the Ottoman Empire that they were a majority.  
The sphere of Islamic jurisdiction of the Ilmiye was reduced in the 
secularization process and the codification of state laws was implemented. 
As a result, commercial, land, civil, and criminal laws were codified, while 
and procedural laws and family laws were modified. Simultaneously, a 
dual judiciary structure - secular (kanun) and religious - was reinforced by 
the Nizamiye judicial system, as a secular territorial jurisdictional system 
under the Ottoman Ministry of Justice. It was completely separated from 
the Sharia system, as religious system mostly under the principle of 
personality53. Sharia courts were in charge of family disputes, orphan´s 
property, charitable endowments (waqf), and some felonies like retaliation 
and blood money.  
Under the Ottomans, the Sharia Law became also simplified, 
standardized and less flexible like the Muslim law under the European 
colonial powers. This process is intensified when the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed at the end of the IWW, and a close encounter between the 
"Ottoman Sharia" and the "colonial Sharia" took place in the Middle East. 
 
 
3.3 - The Exceptionality of Palestine and Israel 
 
The British Empire and France occupied the most of the Ottoman 
territories in the Middle East during the IWW, signing in 1916 the Skyes-
Picot Agreement with the acceptance of the Russian Bolshevik 
Government. The result of this treaty was the establishment of two 
Mandates: the French over Syria and Lebanon (1923-1946), and the British 
on the Mandatory Iraq (1920-1932) and the Mandatory Palestine (1923-
1948). The artificial borders created, as the result of the emergence of new 
nation-states in the Middle East under nationalist ideologies, did not 
resolve the ethnoreligious conflicts; on the contrary, they were aggravated 
by geopolitical strategies and economic interest, keeping the region in a 
precarious political stability. Particularly, the Mandatory Palestine 
represents a unique and complex example, as a result of the political 
success of the Jewish-Zionist movement. 
                                                          
52 See N. ŞEKER, "Identity Formation and the Political Power in the Late Ottoman 
Empire and the Early Turkish Republic". Historia Actual Online, 1, (2005) pp. 59-67. 
53 See a detailed analysis in A. RUBIN, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011. 
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The Ottoman Millet system survived essentially in both Mandates; 
however, the challenge was to include the Muslims in the system. It 
requires the redefinition of the Muslim community as millet and the 
creation of its legal and judicial institutions, transforming the Millet 
system in an instrument of colonial control over Muslims and non-
Muslims54. Like in the territories with Muslim majority submitted to the 
colonial powers from the 19th century, in Palestine a similar new Islamic 
model is created reinventing the Muslim legal tradition by establishing 
communal courts and two ruling institutions: the Grand Mufti and the 
Supreme Muslim Council55.  
The Christian and the Jewish communities under the British rule, 
like under the late Ottoman rule, applied the personal religious 
jurisdiction only in marriage, divorce, alimony, and wills; in other 
personal civil litigations, both parties should agree to submit the case to 
the religious courts. On the contrary, the new Muslim courts uphold an 
absolute control over all matters regarding personal issues. According to 
Laura Robson, the creation of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921 was an 
attempt to formulate a communal model of representation for Muslim 
Palestinians that would facilitate, as well, a communal space to the 
increasing European Jewish presence in Palestine, organized by the Jewish 
Agency, as a strategy to minimize nationalist tensions. The result of this 
strategy was the opposed; progressively since the 1930´, the secular 
nationalist narrative was replaced by an Islamist political one among the 
Muslim Palestinian Arabs56.  
The recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 by a UN resolution 
created in the Palestinian lands a unique and challenging socio-political 
situation, unresolved until today.  
Israel became a nation-state in 1948 by the exceptionality of the 
United Nations´ Partition Resolution 181, voted by the General Assembly 
who requested to the Security Council to take the necessary measures for 
the implementation of a plan establishing two states, Palestine and Israel57. 
This partition is known as the Two-States solution; it is currently under 
academic and intellectual analysis and debate of those scholars in favor of 
                                                          
54 L. ROBSON, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine. University of Texas 
Press, 2011, p. 57.  
55 L. ROBSON, Colonialism and Christianity, cit., p. 58. 
56 L. ROBSON, Colonialism and Christianity, cit., pp. 59-65. 
57 Full text in https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B78526C33 
0061D253 
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the One-State solution58, to be able to overcome seven decades of political 
instability, violence and insecurity in the region.  
Israel does not have a written a Constitution, instead, it has several 
basic laws. One of them is the Human Liberty and Dignity Law, enacted in 
1992; in its text, three basic fundamental rights are not specifically 
included: freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and right to 
equality59.  
In the State of Israel two opposing ideologies - one secular and 
other religious - converge in paradoxical ways under the label of 
“liberation”60, as an outcome of a political compromise between the 
Zionists and the non-Zionist Orthodox group Agudat Israel in 1947 
known as “the religious status quo”61.  
It is a paradox, because of a secularist-nationalist ideology, 
Zionism62, is rooted in a common religious identity, Judaism, and based 
on the religious beliefs of the people who consider themselves chosen by 
God to possess the Promised Land, Palestine. An ideology, somehow, 
revitalized in the 21st century by a neo-Zionism that it is becoming more 
segregationist, refueled recently by the Israeli government´s definition of 
Israel as a “nation-state of Jewish people only”63.  
The new State of Palestine is only de iure a sovereign state. It was 
founded in 1988 by the PLO in exile, forming after the 1993 Oslo Accords 
the Palestinian Authority; in 2012, UN changed its status from entity to 
state but still as a “Non-Member Observer”64. Its original borders have 
                                                          
58 In this sense, see V. TILLEY, A One State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the 
Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock. Manchester University Press, 2005; A. ABUNIMAH, One 
Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. MacMillan, 2006; C. GLICK, 
The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East. Crown Publishing Book, 
2014. Also see the commentary of N. MEZVINSKY, “The One State Solution” 
(http://othersite.org/norton-mezvinsky-the-one-state-solution/). 
59 https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm 
60 See the sociologist analysis of M. WALZER, The Paradox of Liberation. Secular 
Revolutions and Counterrevolutions. Yale University Press, 2015, particularly Chapter 2, 
Zionism v. Judaism. 
61 H. LERNER, “Entrenching the Status-Quo: Religion and State in Israel’s 
Constitutional Proposals” 16/3 (2009) Constellations 16/3 (2009), pp. 1-26. 
62 For a detailed analysis of Zionism, its evolution and its multiple facets (political, 
cultural, socialist, religious, messianic, revisionist), and post-Zionism as a minority 
ideology rooted in the Israeli Academia see, Z. BRAITERMAN, “Zionism” Cambridge 
History of Jewish Philosophy: The Modern Era (eds. Martin Kavka, Zachary Braiterman, and 
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been substantially reduced by the Israeli´s occupation in 1967 and by an 
intensive process of colonization by new continuous Jewish settlements in 
Palestinian lands. 
After the new Middle East nation-states came into existence, the 
Millet system´s legacy still is present somehow in most of them65; like 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and even in Turkey, there is a residual 
part of it. Although the Millet system was formally abolished in Turkey 
under the Ataturk´s leadership, in order to promote a secular state under 
the principle of equality among its citizens. 
In Israel and Palestine, the Millet system - implemented as well 
initially under the Ottoman rule66 and modified by the British Mandate - 
stills is applied.  
The Israeli Millet system has its own peculiarities, completely 
different from the other Arabs nation-states with a Muslim majority of the 
population, because of the uniqueness of Israel as a Jewish neo-colonial 
nation in the region. Let us take a closer look. 
The Israeli legal system can be considered very plural in applying 
the principle of personality of law67, because has maintained the granted 
legal status of the eleven ethnoreligious communities given by British 
Mandate, including the Jewish Community, and adding three more: 
Druses in 1957, Episcopalians in 1970, and Baha'is in 1971; and never tried 
to abolish their status68. Each of those communities exercises their sole 
                                                          
65 K. BARKEY, G. GAVRILIS, “The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial 
Autonomy and its Contemporary Legacy”. Journal of Ethnopolitics (Formerly Global Review 
of Ethnopolitics) 15/1 (2015), pp. 24-42. Issue 1: Non-Territorial Autonomy and the 
Government of Divided Societies. 
66 See a comparative analysis with Bosnia in D. TSIMHONI, “The Status of the Arab 
Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine”. Middle Eastern Studies 20/4 (1984), pp. 
166-192. 
67 For an overview see: Y. SEZGIN, “A Political Account for Legal Confrontation 
between State and Society: The Case of Israeli Legal Pluralism”, Studies in Law, Politics & 
Society 32 (2004), pp. 199-235. 
68 According the Palestine Order in Council (1922) the following communities were 
officially recognized by the Mandatory regime in addition to the Sunni Muslim 
community: the Eastern (Orthodox) Community, the Latin (Catholic) Community, the 
Gregorian Armenian Community, the Armenian (Catholic) Community, the Syrian 
(Catholic) Community, the Chaldean (Uniate) Community, the Jewish Community, the 
Greek Catholic Melkitem Community, the Maronite Community, and the Syrian 
Orthodox Community. See, Y. SEZGIN, “The Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal 
Pluralism through the Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights”, Israel Law Review 
43 (2010), p. 632 ft. 2 and 5. 
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jurisdiction over marriage, divorce and alimony, and concurrent with civil 
jurisdiction mainly on inheritance and testaments.  
The Israeli authorities are entitled to accept or reject the juridical 
recognition of religious communities. Orthodox Judaism is the only 
officially recognized Jewish community, but not Reform Rabbis or 
Conservative Rabbis. As a result, two main issues arise: 1) the government 
does not grant citizenship to converted Jews under the Law of Return to 
Reform and Conservative Jews although the Supreme Court granted in 
2016, still is not legally implemented69; 2) Israeli Jewish marriages only can 
be celebrated by an Orthodox rabbi, in order to be fully recognized by the 
State of Israel under Family Law.  
Israel inherited its system of registering marriage from the Ottoman 
Empire via the British Mandate; under this system, only the Orthodox 
Chief Rabbinate is entitled to celebrate Jewish marriages, and still legally 
is holding the monopoly over Jewish marriage. The 1953 Law of 
Rabbinical Courts established that marriages of Jews in Israel, whether 
citizens or residents are under the exclusive jurisdiction of Orthodox 
rabbinical courts.  
As Yükzel Sezgin explains, among the strongest opponents of this 
situation have been the Reform and Conservative Movements, because 
they cannot celebrate legally weddings in Israel; Israeli weddings 
performed privately, which includes Reform and Conservative 
ceremonies, cannot issued a valid marriage certificate for registration, 
depriving those couples of several economic benefits like residence, 
health, education, insurance, and tax deductions. Moreover, the 1977 Law 
of Penalties establishes criminal punishment (up to six months 
imprisonment) for anyone who performs a Jewish wedding ceremony 
                                                          
69 As Reformed Judaism explained in 2016: “Fifteen years ago, we at the Israel 
Religious Action Center filed a lawsuit demanding that people converted by Reform and 
Conservative rabbis in Israel be recognized as Jews and be granted Israeli citizenship 
under the Law of Return. This past May, the Supreme Court granted status to Jews 
converted by private Orthodox rabbis (as opposed to the government-sponsored 
Orthodox Rabbinate). Following the ruling, we demanded equal treatment under the law. 
The court ordered the government to justify the rules that continue to discriminate 
specifically against us. The government filed their answer this past Friday, and asked the 
court not to take action because the Interior Ministry supposedly intends to introduce 
new legislation to address the problem next year” (http://reformjudaism.org/blog/2016/12/07 
/who-jew-protecting-converts-israel). 
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aside of the Orthodox Rabbinate, knowing that this action is against the 
law70. As a result, Israeli Jews, regardless their religious or non-religious 
beliefs, cannot legally marry not only non-Jews but also non-Orthodox 
Jews in Israel. For this reason, many interfaith couples celebrate their 
marriage abroad in order to be recognized in Israel according to 
International Private Law. As we saw, the Marriage legislation for the 
Jews is imposing the Orthodox Rabbinical authority over marriage, 
divorce, the legitimacy of the children, and inheritance. Since 2010, civil 
unions are recognized only if both spouses are registered as not belonging 
to any religion. However, domestic partnership relations can be 
recognized by a procedure established by the Ministry of Interior. 
From the preservation of the ethnoreligious identity point of view, 
the Israeli Millet system looks very like the old Ottoman one. In both of 
them, the aim is to preserve the power in the hands of dominant group by 
keeping this segment of the population as more separate from the rest and 
as more homogeneous as possible to maintain their identities, Israeli Jews 
in Israel, Ottoman Muslims in the Ottoman Empire71. In both, the 
individual rights are reduced or even ignored in favor of the communal 
ones creating unequal legal models. The Ottoman model was abolished in 
Turkey in 1923; the Israeli model still is in force. 
Part of the strategies to maintain the identity of the dominant group 
in any society is to preserve its purity prohibiting mixed marriages, as the 
Barbarian did when they settled and ruled over the lands of the Western 
Roman Empire, initially prohibiting marriages between Barbarians and 
Romans. In addition, as it was established in the Visigoths laws and later 
in the Christian kingdoms and in Canon Law regarding marriages 
between Catholics and Jews or Muslims. 
The preservation and the hegemony of the Jewish identity in Israel 
are top priorities in its policies since its creation in 1948. As Yükzel Sezgin 
point out72, Golda Meir declared once, that the survival of Israel and the 
Jewish people depended, largely, on their connection to their religion. 
Ben Gurion also considered that the safety and purity of the link between 
the Jewish people and their faith could only be ensured by the 
preservation of rabbinical courts’ monopoly over marital affairs of all 
Israeli Jews.  
                                                          
70 http://www.irac.org/TextFromSearch.aspx?ContentName=Marriage%20in%20Israel 
71 F.A. ERGUL, “The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum?” Middle Eastern 
Studies 48 (2012), pp. 629-645. 
72 Y. SEZGIN, “The Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism Through the 
Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights”, cit., p. 639, ft. 22 and 23. 
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However, looking at the 2016 statistics elaborated and analyzed by 
the Pew Research Center for Religion and Public Life73, Israel seems a 
deeply divided society on religious issues; religious freedom in Israel is 
paradoxical because there is a limited freedom of religion but not freedom 
from religion74.  
In sum, the Israeli legislation is an essential tool in the process of 
homogenization the Jewish-Zionist identity, as well as in the process of 
segregating communities by the Millet system. Moreover, in Israel the 
individual right of religious freedom75 is not protected when the norms of 
a particular religious organization are imposed to preserve the Jewish 
identity as it is envisioned by the political Zionist ideology and by the 
Ashkenazi ruling elite. Izhak Englard affirms that conflicts about law, state 
and religion in Israel are grounded in the very idea of establishing a 
Jewish state76. Furthermore, the identification as a Jewish state creates an 
ongoing conflict with the non-Jewish Israeli citizens related to their 
ethnocultural identity as Arabs77, including few Christians and many 
Muslims.  
As I mentioned at the beginning of this work, language and religion 
are the main elements in building up identities, as it was maintained by the 
Historical School of German jurists under the leadership of Savigny. Even 
more, such a political identity can be reinforced when promotes an 
emotional link to the notion of the homeland as the core of a civic religion. 
For this reasons, in Israel, the secular Zionist ideology favors the 
connection with the Jewish religious legacy of the ancient land of Palestine. 
Israel is a paradoxical example of secularism and nationalism presented as 
deeply rooted in a religious cultural identity78, its Jewishness; although 
there are increasing anti-Zionist movements of Halakha Orthodox Jews 
opposed to the identification of Israel with the Jewish religious identity79. 
                                                          
73 http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ 
74 I. ENGLARD, “Law and religion in Israel”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
35/1 (1987), pp. 196-203 (Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/840166). 
75 Further analysis about religious freedom in Israel F.S. RAVITCH, “Religious 
Freedom and Israeli Law”, Drake Law Review 57 (2008-2009), pp. 879-895. 
76 I. ENGLARD, “Law and religion in Israel”, cit., p. 208. 
77 Further reading G. BARZILAI, Communities and Law. Politics and Cultures of Legal 
Identities. University of Michigan Press, 2003, Chapter 3. 
78 As it is elaborated in synthesis by D.J. ELAZAR, Israel as a Jewish State. Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs (Available at http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/isrjewstate.htm). 
See also S. SMOOHA, “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and 
Democratic State”, Nations and Nationalism 8/4 (2002), pp. 475-501. 
79 Two examples, the Neturei Karta, Jewish United Against Zionism, 
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Still it constitutes today one as one of the most controversial examples of 
the fusion of secular neo-colonialism and ethnoreligious nationalism. In 
which the religious legacy, as sacred texts, of the Exodus - justifying 
territorial occupation by divine law - and the Book of Ezra - prohibiting 
mixed marriage s- still is playing a substantial role in the political Zionist 
narratives of the Jewish identity80, and in the legislation of the State of 
Israel. 
In Israel the Sulha arbitration system was also inherited from the 
Ottoman code Medjella via British Mandate, and it is the foundation of the 
1984 Israeli Mediation Code applied under the principle of territoriality, 
coexisting with the Sulha applied to the Muslim Arab population under 




4 - Toward a Global World: Legal Pluralism and the Development of 
ADR. The Role of Religious Mediation and Arbitration 
 
Legal pluralism, as a scholar topic, became in fashion since 1930´, mostly 
among legal sociologist, and later on among legal anthropologist, when 
George Gurvitch´s concept of ‘social law’82 confronts the traditional 
juridical notion of law.  
The new social approach is developed from the idea that law is a 
broader notion than state-centered law under the nation-state paradigm. 
In the eighties, John Griffiths provoked a further debate affirming that 
legal centralism is just an ideology, distinguishing sociological legal 
pluralism from the juridical or classical legal pluralism83. To open the 
                                                                                                                                                               
(http://www.nkusa.org/) and the True Torah Jews (http://www.truetorahjews.org/). Further 
reading, Y.M. RABKIN, A Threat from Within: A Century of Jewish Opposition to Zionism, 
Zed Books, 2006.  
80 However, there are a new generation of Israeli-Jews, post-Zionists scholars, very 
critics with the official history of Israel like, I. PAPPÉ, A History of Modern Palestine: One 
Land, Two People. Cambridge University Press, 2004. From another provocative and 
controversial approach see S. SAND, The Invention of the Jewish People, English translation 
from Y. Lotanm, Verso, London, 2009. 
81 Further analysis in D. PELY, Muslim/Arab Mediation and Conflict Resolution, cit., 
Chapter 7. 
82 R. BANAKAR, “Integrating Reciprocal Perspectives. On Georges Gurvitch’s 
Sociology of Law”, Oñati Prize Essay in Sociology of Law, Oñati/Internet, 2000. 
83 J. GRIFFITHS, What is Legal Pluralism?, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 18/24 (1986), pp. 1-55; S.A. JACKSON, “Legal Pluralism between Islam and the 
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debate among social scholars the new Journal of Legal Pluralism and Un-
official Law was created in 198184. Until then, most of the positivist legal 
scholars paid a limited attention to it, focusing their analysis on 
international and comparatives legal studies. Initially, sociological and 
anthropological studies were centered in postcolonial states, later also 
include non-colonial states. Indeed, such a dialectical analysis channels a 
better understanding of the dynamics between the imposition of the law 
and the resistance to it, as well as the interaction among the ruling elite 
and the subordinate groups85. Furthermore, as Baudouin Dupret 
explains86, with the emergence of the “concept” of post-modernity, 
scholars oriented their research in legal pluralism toward a new definition 
of pluralism focused in the juxtaposition of many cultural and legal 
histories. 
However, under the Rule of Law system some questions should be 
answer in order to establish a common principle of legality in such 
juxtaposition. How fits in this approach the notion of individual 
fundamental rights?  Like equality before the law or religious freedom, or 
who is in charge of public policy; or how to guarantee the security or the 
publicity of a juridical action? Somehow, the challenge still is how to 
balance dissimilar cultures, and how to accommodate them in the rule of 
law system governing the nation-state paradigm under a Constitutional 
frame of the Modern legal systems.  
In sum, how accommodate dissimilar cultures and religious 
traditions into a secular nomocracy? 
As we saw already, historically multiple legal orders have been 
coexisting since the Antiquity. According to the leading legal scholar 
William Twining87, expert in Jurisprudence, legal pluralism as a social fact 
is a common phenomenon, taking into account that: 1) legal pluralism is 
simultaneously a social fact and a normative fact; 2) it must be 
distinguished between legal pluralism and legal poly-centricity, coexisting 
                                                                                                                                                               
Nation-State: Romantic Medievalism or Pragmatic Modernity?” Fordham Int'l Law Journal, 
30 (2006), p. 158. 
84 The JLP was first published in 1969, under the title African Law Studies (issues 1-18). 
From 2013, the JLP is in volume format (Volume 45 onwards). The Journal publishes 
three issues a year (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjlp20/current). 
85 See in this sense S.E. MERRY, “Legal Pluralism”, Law & Society Review, 22/5 
(1988), p p .  869-896. Particularly, pp. 889-890. 
86 B. DUPRET, “Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices”. European 
Journal of Legal Studies 1/1 (2007), pp. 1-26, p. 9. 
87 W. TWINING, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective”. Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 20 (2010), pp. 473-517. Particularly, pp. 488-89. 
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in time and space two or more autonomous or semi-autonomous legal 
orders, not necessarily in conflict or competition; 3) it cannot be opposed 
or debilitate the rule of law, human rights, and democracy.  
Legal sociologists and anthropologists provide a dialectical and an 
interactive analysis extremely useful to legal scholars focusing on how 
plural identities and legal traditions can decentralize the state law system; 
they are opening new possibilities with the increase of the globalization 
process and its dynamics; as a result, more attention is paid to legal 
pluralism from a global approach.  
The globalization process in which we are immersed expands, even 
more, the challenge of legal pluralism. The complexities of today's world 
require a change of methodology dealing with the globalization process. 
As José Casanova describes, the limited Western-centrism approach and 
comparative national analysis demand a new methodology88 able to 
replace local or even international understanding by a transnational global 
comprehension of the dynamics of societies and the notion of multiples 
modernities, as “ongoing reconstructions of multiple patterns”89 in this 
multilayered digital information age of the 21st century. 
As consequence, legal pluralism demands a change of perspective 
in the conventional division between territorial and personal laws, 
national and international, private or public laws. Even more, 
globalization has further implications particularly to non-state laws 
transforming them in transnational laws90; like for example, the expansion 
of religions or the local customs as result of global immigration.  
                                                          
88 In this sense J. CASANOVA, “Public religions Revisited”, Religion: Beyond the 
Concept (Hent de Vries, ed.), Fordham University Press., 2008, pp. 101-119. 
89 S.N. EISENSTADT, “Multiple modernities”. Transaction Publishers, 2000. Also in 
Daedalus, Winter, vol. 129 (2000), pp. 1-29. 
90 W. TWINING, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective”, cit., p. 506, 
affirms: “in considering the implications of globalization for the discipline of law as it is 
institutionalized in a particular country or region, it is helpful to distinguish between (a) 
established transnational fields that command increased attention (e.g., regional 
integration, transnational commercial law, human rights law); (b) new or developing 
subjects that have strong transnational aspects (e.g., transitional justice, Internet law, 
environmental law); (c) established fields formerly perceived as domestic that have 
recently acquired increased transnational dimensions, such as torts, family, and criminal 
law; (d) the diffusion of religious law and customary practices associated with large scale 
migration; and (e) the interface with municipal state law in Northern countries of the 
religious and customary practices of ethnic minorities (both immigrant and indigenous). 
Most of these examples relate to state law, but globalization also has implications for the 
diffusion of religion, custom, and other forms of non-state law and for the interaction of 
state and non-state law at different levels of relations and ordering”. 
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Global legal pluralism, for legal scholars, seems a term too 
ambiguous to fit in the technicalities and the precise interpretations 
required by a juridical approach. However:  1) it offers a different vision of 
the relations among communities, power and authority, allowing to study 
neglected or non-visible legal orders, like the informal justice systems (IJS) 
that resolve 80% of disputes in many countries91; 2) it provides with a 
wider inter-legality comparative analysis; 3) and facilitates the 
relationships among state legal systems and legal cultures of communities 
in multicultural societies. 
One powerful expanding example of global legal pluralism is the 
transnational experience of arbitration, conciliation, and mediation in 
communities transcending legal systems. Basically, consists in the 
intervention of a neutral party in a conflict between two opponents 
facilitating its resolution; when the neutral party takes an authoritative 
interventionist role is called conciliation; arbitration requires that both 
parties bind themselves to the arbiter’s decision, and in mediation, the 
parties are not tied to any mediator decision. 
Traditional mediation and conciliation are ancient practices from 
the Antiquity, as I mentioned. Modern mediation is a social movement 
and practice that started in the US about four decades ago, in the 
seventies, opening a new alternative path to conflict resolution. The dual 
Western legal traditions of Anglo common law and Continental European 
civil Law, globalized by the European colonialism, is challenged by this 
new mediation as alternative dispute resolution (ADR); particularly, as a 
process to overcome the crisis in the traditional administration of justice92. 
The most innovative tool in this process is the multi-door courthouse 
introduced by Frank Sander institutionalizing ADR inside the courts and 
helping to speed up and diminish adversarial interaction in legal 
processes. Since then, in common law and civil law countries, ADR has 
been developed extensively and the skills of mediators have been 
improved. Particularly, the role of religion and religious organizations in 
mediation is expanding quickly at international level and at a communal 
level.  
                                                          
91 For a study of IJS see A Study of Informal Justice Systems: Charting a Course of Human 




92 N. ALEXANDER, “Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave” 6/3 (2003) 
ADR Bulletin, p. 5, footnote (Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol6/iss3/1). 
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Religion can play a dual role, as a source of conflict or as a bridge to 
peacemaking93, as an obstacle or as a strategy for conflict resolution. 
Religion and religious leaders have been blamed consistently for 
encouraging bigotry and hate, and for their active role participating or 
promoting conflicts and even justifying violence; such a role always is 
linked to power, resentment or/and politics. Some examples: the role of 
the Papacy in the Crusades, the religious wars in Europe between 
Protestants and Catholics, or the today´s increasing conflict between 
Sunnis and Shias in Middle East94; in most of the cases, theological 
disputes play a lesser role, although can be used to justify violence as well.  
However, religious communities and religious leaders can also 
engage in a powerful peacemaker´s role at three levels: leadership, inter-
communal and intra-communal.  
 
 At the leadership level, the medieval Papacy played a consistent 
role as mediator or as arbiter in Europe among rulers in many 
political disputes. More recently, for example, Pope John Paul II 
mediated in the conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1985 and 
recently Pope Francis offered his mediation between the 
Venezuela´s government and the opposition. In Palestine and 
Israel, the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land 
established in 2005 is taking an active role promoting peace and 
reconciliation in Palestine and Israel95. 
 At inter-communal level, many religious organizations are taking 
also actives roles as peacemakers. Here are some examples: the 
Quakers in Nigeria through the Interfaith Mediation Center; in 
Sierra Leona the Inter-religious Council facilitating the 
reconciliation peace process; the Catholic organization the 
Community of San´Egidio in Mozambique96; and the Sulha Peace 
                                                          
93 Further readings: M. GOLPIN, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World 
Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking. Oxford University Press, 2000, Chapter II: “Between 
Religion and Conflict Resolution: Mapping a New Field of Study”; D. LITTLE, 
Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution. Cambridge University 
Press, 2007; D. SMOCK, “Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace”. 
Institute of Peace, Special Report 201, 2009. (https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
sr201.Pdf). 
94 S. HUNTER, “Sunni-Shia Tensions Are More About Politics, Power and Privilege 
than Theology” (Available at https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/sunni-shia-tensions). 
95 https://www.crihl.org/history 
96 J. BERCOVITCH, S.A. KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, “Religion and Mediation: The 
Role of Faith-Base Actors in International Conflict Resolution”, International Negotiation 14 
(2009), pp. 175-204, particularly pp. 180-183. See also F. MATTHEWS-GIBA, “Religious 
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Project is working in the reconciliation between Israelis and 
Palestinians97. As Ricardo Padilla affirms98, religious belief-system 
in the faith-based mediation field is the essential and transcendent 
factor because can serve as the context, the method, and the 
medium facilitating the understanding and the reconciliation 
processes.  
 
It is also important to grasp the role of religious interfaith dialogues 
in which sacred text can be a powerful tool and a moral anchor99 opening 
or facilitating by theological shifts a common ground in religious 
narratives, values, and peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, religious 
dialogues are extremely challenging; and from a logocentric approach, 
they have limitations, as Thomas Scheffler affirms100, like for example the 
Regensburg´s speech of Pope Benedict XVI in 2005 misunderstood by 
many Muslims reacting emotionally against what they considered an 
attack on the Islamic faith.  
One of the biggest challenges to interfaith dialogues is to overcome 
defensive and emotional aspects of collective egos and self-identities 
promoting sectarianism, trying to prove that one of them possess the 
whole truth. There are many historical examples: the Christological 
disputes between Arians and Trinitarians in the Imperial Ecumenical 
councils´ era until the III Council of Constantinople (680) imposing finally 
the Trinitarian Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed; the famous Middle Age 
debates among Christians, Muslims and Jews hosted by rulers in their 
domains; or the disputations in the 16th century Imperial Diets, Reichstage, 
between Catholics and Protestants, even although they reached to the 
agreement of cuius regio eius religio (whose realm his religion) - established by 
the Peace of Augsburg (1555) under the principle of religious segregation 
and the submission of the subjects to the ruler´s religion - such an 
agreement did not prevent the outcome of political-religious wars that 
                                                                                                                                                               
Dimension of Mediation” Fordham Urban Law Journal 27/5 (1999), pp. 1695-1710.  
97 http://www.sulha.com/ 
98 F. PADILLA, “Understanding Faith Based Mediation: A Multidimensional Model” 
2014 (Available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/PadillaR1.cfm). 
99 J.L.HURST, “Holy Conflict: the Intersection of Religion and Mediation”. The Journal 
of Living Together, International Center for Inter-Religious Mediation, 2015, pp. 32-38. 
(https://www.icermediation.org/projects-campaigns/journal-of-living-together/jamie-l-hurst/). 
100 T. SCHEFFLER, “Interreligious Dialogue and Peacebuilding”. Die Friedens-Warte. 
Religion, Krieg und Frieden, 82/2,3 (2007), pp. 173-187, p. 174 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/237 
73933?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents). 
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lasted in Europe until the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Most of these 
debates did not stop persecution or violence, on the contrary, expanded it. 
Asymmetrical communities also represent a huge test for interfaith 
dialogues, when rapid social changes or new religious movements alter 
the traditional coexistence among communities, like aggressive 
fundamentalist Evangelical proselytism, or Salafist and Wahhabist 
ideologies101. 
Contemporary interfaith dialogue requires four types of dialogue, 
according to Francis Cardinal Arinze, President of the Vatican´s Pontifical 
Council for Interreligious Dialogue (1985-2002): a dialogue of life, a 
dialogue of social engagement, a dialogue of theological exchange, and 
dialogue of religious experience102.  
In sum, in international and transnational spaces, religious leaders 
can play an essential role bringing moral authority and respect as reliable 
and effective mediators, helping enormously in processes of building 
peace and reconciliation as well as in the interfaith dialogues. At inter-
communal level, they can also facilitate the pacific coexistence among 
diverse ethnoreligious communities.  
 
 Finally, at an intra-communal level, religious organizations can 
channel private mediation and arbitration among their members in 
many multi-dimensional paths. In recent years, the so-called 
religious arbitration has been developed in secular nation-states 
creating an ongoing legal and politically polarized debate 
regarding the legitimacy of religious courts, as arbitration tribunals, 
under the secular rule of law system. This debate also reopened the 
multiculturalism discussions and the distinction between an old 
multiculturalism and a new multiculturalism, and the challenges of 
sectarianism103; therefore, the risks of latent clashes between public 
policies or fundamental rights, and religious arbitration.  
What are the potential dangers in religious arbitration? 
1) Pressure or even coercion on the members of a religious community 
to bring the case to a religious court, preventing the voluntary 
nature of the arbitration. 
2) Applying unfair rules; for example, regarding women in Jewish 
and in Islamic laws. 
                                                          
101 T. SCHEFFLER, “Interreligious Dialogue and Peacebuilding”, cit., p. 181. 
102 T. SCHEFFLER, “Interreligious Dialogue and Peacebuilding”, cit., p. 176. 
103 M.A. HELFAND, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders. New York University Law Review, 86/5 (2011), pp. 1231-1305. 
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3) Weakening the secular rule of law system in favor of strengthening 
religious sovereignties. 
4) Reinforcing the communal religious freedom in detriment of the 
individual religious freedom by empowering religious authorities. 
5) Promoting the isolation of religious communities by emphasizing 
less interaction with the rest of the population and other 
communities in the society. 
 
To be able to address properly those risks we should take a closer look at 
those countries implementing religious arbitration and the interaction of 
legal mechanisms to prevent or limit the dangers mentioned above. 
 
 
4.1 - The American Experience in Religious Arbitration: the Jewish Beth 
Din Courts and the Challenge of Islamic Arbitration 
 
The United States of America represents the success of a nation-state build 
up by a continuous flow of immigrants, although African slaves and 
Native Americans are the biggest moral burden and the darkest legacy of 
its success.  
Particularly, the process of jurisdictional accommodation of the 
Native American nations, more than 500 tribes, has been very challenging 
because of abusive peace treaties often violated by the American 
government, and their relocation in Indian reservations in poor lands. One 
of the biggest tests was their legal autonomy and jurisdictional 
sovereignty. The combination of the principle of territoriality and the 
principle of personality developed a triple jurisdiction in a unique model 
implemented in the US based on three types of sovereign entities: Federal, 
State, and Indian tribes. Each of them has their own judicial system 
because of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. As Justice O´Connor 
explained104, in 1992 were about 170 tribal courts with jurisdiction over 
one million Native Americans, and since then there is an increasing 
process to incorporate their own customs and moral values, even 
integrating traditional Indian dispute-resolution methods, although some 
of them still prefer the adversarial process105.  
Since the colonial times, European religious refugees settled their 
religious communities in America. The birth as nation-state under the 
                                                          
104 S.D. O'CONNOR, “Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts”, Tulsa 
Law Journal 33/1 (1997), pp. 1-6 (http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/ tlr/vol33/iss1/1). 
105 For an updated list see http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm 
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constitutional principle of the separation of church and state, constituted 
another jurisdictional challenge for those religious communities because 
they lost not only their status as established churches but also their 
religious jurisdictions. Consequently, their religious courts lost their 
power. After 1820, some new religious movements, like the Mormons, 
initially did not take their legal disputes to the state court system; after 
Utah became state in 1850, the Mormons tried to have their arbitration 
tribunals coexisting with the state courts for a while, becoming 
progressively less powerful when the population of the state became more 
dissimilar106.  
Traditionally, the Jewish communities tried to avoid secular courts 
since the Antiquity, because it was a halakhic general prohibition to resolve 
disputes in gentile courts, and accepting secular court is considered a 
denial of the Torah laws, although they are exceptions107. After the Roman 
administration abolished the Jewish courts in Palestine, religious 
arbitration became a regular practice among Jews under the principle of 
personality of laws. The immigrant Jewish communities in America 
continued this tradition and at the beginning of the 20th century, they 
established in New York the Kehillak tribunals that practically disappeared 
after the I WW. Under the legal frame of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) two Jewish courts are created: the Jewish Arbitration Court in 1929 
and the Jewish Conciliation Court of America in 1930. 
The FAA is rooted in the contract theories establishing a limited 
space of jurisdictional autonomy. Its main characteristics are: 1) creates a 
common legal structure for arbitration; 2) it is based on the freedom of the 
parties to accept the arbitration; 3) but when it is accepted, it has a binding 
nature108.  
                                                          
106 M. J. BROYDE, Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical Courts, and Christian Panels. Religious 
Arbitration in America and the West. Oxford University Press, 2017. Chapter 4 B: Religious 
Arbitration in America.  
For a comparative analysis between US and Canada, see N. WALTER, “Religious 
Arbitration in the United States and Canada”, Santa Clara Law Rev., 52 (2012), pp. 501-569 
(Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss2/4). 
107 Y. FEIT, “The Prohibition Against Going to Secular Courts”. The Journal of the Beth 
Din in America, 1 (2012), pp. 30-47 (http://jlaw.com/Articles/ProhibitionSecularCourts.pdf). See 
also, M. WILLIG, “Retaining the Proceeds of Secular Court Judgments” The Journal of the 
Beth Din in America, 2 (2014), pp. 11-14. For access to all the articles in The Journal of the 
Beth Din in America, vol. 1 (2012) and vol.2 (2014) https://bethdin.org/journal/ 
108 M.J. BROYDE, Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical Courts, and Christian Panels cit., ibidem, 
particularly footnotes 57-66.  
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The main areas of religious arbitration under the FAA are Labor 
and commercial relations, prenuptial agreements, marriage dissolution, 
and Family Law. In any case, as a ruling principle, fundamental individual 
rights - as they are recognized by the Bill of Rights - are guaranteed and 
cannot be suppressed or restricted by arbitration. As a result, Jewish, 
Christians, and Muslim arbitration courts, tribunals or panels have been 
operating harmoniously with secular US courts as any other arbitration 
tribunal. 
In 1960, the Beth Din of America (BDA) is founded among 
American Jewish communities, as Rabbi Michael Broyde explains109, to 
provide a settlement forum for Jews living in accordance with halakha in 
the American secular legal context under and the American arbitration 
legal frame. As a result, the Jewish Arbitration in the US takes place in the 
Beth Din Courts. However not all disputes accepted by the FAA can be 
resolved in them; for example, these courts cannot grant a divorce if a 
husband refuses to divorce his wife, and as a result, she cannot remarry 
remaining chained to that marriage as agunah. 
In general, it is considered a successful arbitration process because 
they are neutral, technical, and transparent procedures compatible with 
the American secular legal frame. The main features of the Ben Din 
Arbitration judicial process are the following110: 
 
1) Formal published procedural rules, regarding objectivity and 
impartiality to the arbitration process and admissibility of evidence. 
2) Simultaneously consistent with the Jewish law and the secular due 
process. 
3) The structural and hierarchical composition of the court and is 
recommended that its members should have a dual legal system 
background as experts in Halakha and American Law. 
4) Optional transcription of the proceedings.  
5) Guarantees preventing coercion of one of the parties. 
6) An internal appellate process to review the case in a period of 20 
days. This is an addition to fit in a secular due process because 
traditional Jewish law didn´t have a formal right to appeal. 
 
                                                          
109 M.J. BROYDE, Sharia Tribunals, cit., Part 3, Chapter 7 A. Further information on the 
rules and procedures, opening a case, specific provision for contracts and prenuptial 
agreements, and general guidelines of the Ben Din courts https://bethdin.org/forms/  
110 Further analysis of these features in M.J. BROYDE, Sharia Tribunals, cit., and M. 
BRODYE, “Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons offered to Sharia Courts by the Beth 
Din of America Precedent”, New York Law School Law Rev., 57 (2012-2013), pp. 287-311. 
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Other existing judicial models in America under the principle of 
personality with a long nomocratic tradition are the Ecclesiastical 
Tribunals of the Catholic Church. However, there are not under the 
American arbitration system. They are an independent judiciary structure 
ruled by Canon Law codes, Latin or Eastern, regarding sacraments - 
among them canonical regulations for a valid celebration of marriage - 
ecclesiastical disputes, disciplining clergy, and marriage canonical 
annulments which only have a canonical effect, not civil or secular 
consequences. In the US there are about 200 Catholic Tribunals taking an 
average of 15.000 marriage annulment cases per year111. 
Most of Christian Protestant churches and denominations are not 
nomocratic and for this reason, they don´t have structural procedures; 
usually, they can accommodate easily to the secular arbitration system, 
although often they have pastoral mediation and disciplinary mechanisms 
mostly for clergy. 
The Muslim communities in the US are also establishing their own 
arbitration tribunals, using the fiqh scholar legal tradition and the sulha as 
reconciliation practices, following the example of many other religious 
communities involving commercial disputes and Family Law. 
The 2010 Imams Conference, the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of 
America (AMJA) was in favor to promote and improve Islamic arbitration 
establishing some clarifications and parameters112 that, eventually, can 
facilitate harmonizing the Legal Muslim tradition with the secular legal 
tradition and with the American arbitration laws. According to Rabbi 
Michael Brodye113, the Beth Din experience can be a useful comparative 
example for Muslim arbitration tribunals. Although, he is aware of the 
significant segments of the American society distrusting Islamic law and 
arbitration tribunals, and many secular judges are cautious regarding to 
enforce their decisions because they perceive Islamic arbitration informal, 
close, and secret.  
Islamic scholars have to find their own legal resources to adjust the 
three main procedural jurisprudential interrelated paths in Muslim 
                                                          
111 For an overview see the Pew Forum "Applying God’s Law: Religious Courts and 




113 M. BRODYE, “Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons offered to Sharia Courts by 
the Beth Din of America Precedent”, cit, and his 2017 book Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical 
Courts, and Christian Panels cit., Part 3, Chapter 8, C. 
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disputes - qada (judicial), takhim (arbitration), and sulha (mediation as a 
reconciliation process) - to the US legal frame, the FAA, and the public 
interest. 
In recent years, Muslim immigration to the US is becoming a new 
source of tensions like in the most of the European countries. According to 
the 2015 Pew Center research and survey of US Muslims, there is a total 
population of 3,3 million, and it is estimated as the fastest growing 
immigrant population in the US114. Unfortunately, as it happened with 
each new immigration wave to US rejection and discrimination re-
emerged cyclically in the American society; first, with the Jews115, and 
then with the Irish, the Italians, the Latinos, and with the Catholics in 
general until an Irish descendant and Catholic, John Kennedy, was elected 
US President.  
In the 21st century, the fast growing Muslim immigration is 
galvanizing fear - in addition to the Islamophobic rhetoric since 9/11 
fueled by the ongoing Middle East wars - also because Sharia law is 
considered a threat to the American secular legal system. A similar 
process is taking place in Europe 116. 
As a result, at least in 15 states their Legislative bodies are passing 
state bills banning specifically the use of Islamic (Sharia) law in the 
American courts, and even the use of any foreign law or international 
law117. As consequence, those state bills would compromise and invalidate 
                                                          
114 See the Pew Forum 2016 and 2017 surveys and research http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-population/; http://www.pewforum.org/2 
017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/ 
115 Until the II WW it was a deep anti-Semitism in US even among scholars; as 
example, the words of the well-recognized and awarded scholar W.O. SWINTON (1833-
1892), who has 46 books catalogued on the Library of Congress and had the gold medal 
for textbooks in the Paris Exhibition of 1878 with his book New Word Analysis. In his 
presentation of the Outlines of General History, N. York, 1880, re-edited several times he 
explains that “the race to which we belong, the Aryan, has always played the leading part in the 
great drama of the world´s progress”). And considers that “the Semites do not make nearly so 
important or so conspicuous a figure in history as do the Aryans. They have never been greatly 
progressive (...). If we trace back the present civilization of the advanced nations of the world, -our 
own civilization, and that of England, Germany, France, Italy, etc,- we shall find that much of it is 
connected by a direct and unbroken line with Roman".  
See it in the Gutenberg Project available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19346 
116 Further reading: Muslim Family Law in Western Courts (ed. By Elisa Giunchi). 
Routledge, 2014. 
117 For example, the Amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution, that forbade the use 
of international law and Sharia Law. (Available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questio 
ns/755.pdf). 
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the religious arbitration settlements; although the most of US Federal 
Courts are blocking those state bills and amendments on the grounds of 
the violation of the First Amendment. US Supreme Court consistently has 
ruled that judges and other government officials may not interpret 
religious doctrine or rule on theological matters118. At the same time, US 
courts have a long tradition using foreign laws, even mentioning religious 
laws as part of the Judeo-Christian legacy. For this reason, US Courts 
occasionally quote religious laws without theological interpretation. 
In sum, the tension between the US First Amendment´s 
Constitutional Clauses (Free exercise and non-Establishment of religion) is 
also present in the religious arbitration debate. Here is the core question: Is 
religious arbitration expanding religious freedom by restricting the secular 
rule of law system? It is not a new debate; how to balance religious 
freedom with the limits of the separation between religious organizations 
or communities and a secular state has been the main problem in the US 
Supreme Court since Reynolds v. US in 1875 (regarding Mormon 
polygamy), addressed by evaluating public interest, public morality, 
applying accommodation rules, and creating standard tests. 
Historically, the US as a nation-state is considered a secular nation 
of religious citizens, initially rooted in Protestant communities and 
culture. According to the analysis and statistics of the Pew Forum 
organization, in the last decade, United States is changing its religious 
landscape toward a society more secular than ever119, as Western Europe 
did in the last decades as well; however, religious communities continue 
flourishing in America. Perhaps, as Oliver Roy maintains120, there is a 
process of reconstruction of religious identities, and we are witnessing a 
reconfiguration of the relations among religion, state, society and 
communities, because the demands of more visibility of religion in the 
public sphere. Certainly, new forms of religiosity, including new religious 
movements and neo-fundamentalisms, are taking advantage of the 
globalization process121 for the reason that they can connect with those 
who are experiencing a process of loss of identity in their communities 
and societies, and they are searching for new ideals to rely on. 




120 O. ROY, Secularism Confronts Islam (English trans. from G.G. Holoch). Columbia 
University Press, 2005, Chapter 2. 
121 Further reading, O. ROY, Globalized Islam. In Search for a New Ummah. Columbia 
University Press, 2004. 
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4.2 - Confronting the Fear of Islamic Arbitration Tribunals in the UK, 
Canada, and Australia 
 
The UK, Canada, and Australia are facing similar challenges like the US 
regarding Muslim legal traditions and its interaction with common law 
secular nomocracies.  
Among Muslim scholars, there is not an analogous approach on 
this issue; some scholars consider that Sharia has the potential to coexist 
with secular traditions122. Abdullahi An-Na'im offers a challenging view 
affirming that Sharia will always remain open to reinterpretation and 
evolution, and he distinguishes between Islam and state, and Islam and 
politics; in his analysis, one aspect of modernization and colonization has 
been the fossilization and distortion of the role of Sharia in Islamic 
societies. In sum, he considers that secularism is able to unite diverse 
communities of believing and practice into one political community; it 
means that "a secular state is a necessary framework for negotiating ethical 
differences among citizens, but not for adjudicating and resolving such a 
differences", that implies “protecting civil reasoning and adjudicating 
disputes according to established constitutional and judicial criteria and 
processes”123. 
Unfortunately, the media often played a bias and alarming role 
creating confusion and rejection in the public opinion about the role of 
Sharia in secular legal systems and the risk of Islamization and 
enforcement of Sharia changing the legal frame of in these countries. 
The UK has a very diverse Muslim population, initially emigrating 
from the British colonies around the world. According to the British 
Council of Muslims124 and the data from 2011 Census, there are over two 
million Muslims, almost 5% of the British population and it is the fastest 
growing one. 
In Britain, a fierce debate is taking place regarding the role of Sharia 
in Muslim arbitration procedures and its accommodation to the common 
law system125.  
                                                          
122 A.E. SPARR, “Legal Pluralism and Sharia: Implementing Islamic Law in States and 
Societies” (Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2014/12/18/legal-pluralism-and-sharia-implementi 
ng-islamic-law-in-states-and-societies/). 
123 A.A. An-NA'IM, Islam and the Secular State. Negotiating the Future of Shari´a. 
Harvard University Press, 2008. Chapter 7. 
124 http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslimstatistics/ 
125 For an overview on the different levels of possible accommodation of Sharia 
tribunals in the UK legal frame, the debate in favor and against, and the initial arguments 
presented in 2008 by Lord Phillips as Lord Chief Justice in England and Wales affirming 
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The 1996 English Arbitration Act is enacted with similar limits like 
the American 1925 FAA. Basically, they are public interest and procedural 
protection for impartial arbitration, but didn´t follow the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by UN in 
1985 and amended in 2006.  
To be able to grasp the roots of the debate in the UK, we have to 
mention the creation in 1982 of the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) that has 
been acting as informal arbitration tribunal, although there is recent 
criticism about the ISC accused of promoting and applying 19th century 
Muslim neo-fundamentalist revivalist interpretations of Sharia of two 
Islamist movements: the Deobandi movement126, developed in the 
aftermath of the failed Indian Rebellion of 1857 against the British colonial 
rule; and the Salafism, developed first in Egypt and later in the Arab 
Peninsula as counter movement against the modernization process that 
took place in the Ottoman Empire127. 
In 2007, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT)128 is formed in the 
UK addressing commercial disputes, family mediation, premarital 
agreements, dowry, divorce, and inheritance laws and wills; setting a clear 
policy against forced marriages and fully supporting the civil protection of 
2007 Forced Marriage Act129. The efforts of the MAT are also oriented to a 
legal harmonization between Muslim legal traditions and the British 
Common Law system. As a result, MAT is creating several legally 
sophisticated procedural mechanisms and creative interpretations to 
accommodate the legal Islamic tradition to the British rule of law system, 
in order to guarantee legal fairness and protection of both parties involved 
in the dispute. 
                                                                                                                                                               
that "There is no reason why principles of Sharia Law or any other religious code should 
not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution" supported 
by Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury at that time. See M. ZEE, “Five Options 
for the Relationship between the State and Sharia Councils Untangling the Debate on 
Sharia Councils and Women’s Rights in the United Kingdom” Journal of Religion and 
Society 16 (2014),  pp. 1-18. (http://www.academia.edu/5732256/Five_Options_for_the_Relation 
ship_between_the_State_and_Sharia_Councils_Untangling_the_Debate_on_Sharia_Councils_an 
d_Women_s_Rights_in_the_United_Kingdom 
126 Further readings, M. MOJ, The Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends 
and Tendencies. Anthem Press, 2015.  
127 For a recent analysis of the Wahabbist Salafism see M. BIN ALI, The roots of religious 
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However, one of the main recent debates involves the possible 
coercion of Muslim women under narrow interpretations of Sharia. For 
this reason, two new bills have been proposed to balance and protect 
Muslim women facing possible intimidation: The Divorce (Financial 
Provision) Bill 2016-17[HL] and The Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(Equality) Bill [HL] 2016-17, still both are in discussion in the House of 
Lords130. 
In sum, in the UK is clear the trend in favor of implementing 
legislation to balance and promote equal treatment under the law, 
preventing the risk of women´s discrimination under unfair religious laws 
or abusive cultural traditions. However, the biggest challenge indeed at 
this moment still is to evaluate the perils and the social consequences of 
excluding accommodation and intervention in religious arbitration, 
because it can promote a communal space outside the frame and the 
protection of the secular rule of law system, fortifying undercover abuses 
and oppression on religious grounds. This is the challenge that Canadians 
and Australians are facing too. 
In Canada, the first Muslims immigrants were few Bosniaks mainly 
after the IWW. According to the 1991 Census, Muslim population was 
then more than a quarter of million, and in 2011 Census is over a 
million131, a 3.2% of the population, the fastest growing population, in 
comparison Jewish population that is about quarter a million. 
Religious arbitration was operating under the 1991 Arbitration Act; 
the Jewish Beth Din courts have been fluently arbitrating in the Orthodox 
Jewish communities, like some other religious communities. 
In 2003 was founded a Muslim platform, the Islamic Institute of 
Civil Justice (IICJ), offering Muslim arbitration as part of its services under 
the Arbitration Canadian Legislation legal frame, addressing Muslims to 
resolve their disputes by the IICJ. The creation of the IICJ opened a bitter 
social and political debate about Muslim arbitration in Canadian 
provinces.  
                                                          
130 For a comparative evaluation see, S. THOMSON, R. SANDERS, “Common defects 
of the Divorce Bill and Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill 2016-17”. Family 
Law 47 (2017), pp. 425-451 (Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316215907_ 
Common_defects_of_the_Divorce_Bill_and_Arbitration_and_Mediation_Services_Equality_Bill_
2016-17 and at http://orca.cf.ac.uk/99619/). 
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In 2004 Marion Boyd, a member of the New Democratic Party in 
Ontario and a well-known defender of women´s rights, was 
commissioned by the Attorney General and by the Minister Responsible 
for Women´s Issues, to make a report regarding arbitration in Family Law. 
As the Report indicates132, there was significant confusion in the media 
and public consciousness about a plan by the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice to establish a “Sharia Court” in Ontario. In her report, she 
recommended the possibility to incorporate religious arbitration including 
Muslim arbitration, adding a good number of safeguards for the proper 
implementation. 
Among the opponents, Muslims and non-Muslims, to establishing 
religious arbitration tribunals under the 1991 Arbitration Act, Shirish 
Chotalia is mainly concern about the constitutional obligations of the 
Canadian government to ensure that Muslim law is not used to bypass or 
subvert Canadian law133. In favor of the religious arbitration by the IICJ, 
Marie Egan Provins considers that, even if coercion in family cases and 
premarital agreements can eventually take place, there are solutions to 
prevent it, as Marion Boyd recommended134. Among those measures or 
safeguards, written records of the proceeding can be implemented by 
creating a provincial registry, and the independent Legal Advice (ILA), 
designed to protect vulnerable people, can provide with an autonomous 
counselor able to explain to Muslim women their rights under Canadian 
laws. 
However, the media reports about on beating, stoning, and 
beheading, imposed mainly on women by extremist Sharia courts in the 
Middle East and Africa135, create an atmosphere of distress and rejection 
toward Muslim arbitration in the public opinion; as a result, in 2005 the 
Ontario´s premier ban religious arbitration under the 1991 Arbitration Act 
(adopted in Ontario in 1992). In addition, in 2005 the Quebec Legislature 
passed a motion against Sharia to be used in the legal system of this 
province136. 
                                                          
132 https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary. 
html 
133 S.P. CHOTALIA, “Arbitration Using Sharia Law in Canada: A Constitutional and 
Human Rights Perspective”, Constitutional Forum, 15/2 (2006), pp. 63-78. 
134 For a detailed analysis of the pros and cons, see M.E. PROVINS, "Constructing an 
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice That Encourages Women's Rights”, Loyola L.A. Int'l & 
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The main problem in both, political and legislative, decisions is that 
they cannot prevent the existence of private informal arbitration outside 
the Canadian legal system, on the contrary, they will proliferate; as a 
result, women rights cannot be fully protected. Banning formal Islamic 
arbitration open the path to informal underground arbitration, that is not 
able to be supervised by formal procedures, and is not harmonized with 
the secular legal frame of the Arbitration Act, impeding secular courts to 
intervene in cases of unfair treatment toward the party most vulnerable.  
In sum, banning Muslim arbitration under the Canadian 
Arbitration Act does not resolve the problem of discrimination and 
coercion of women; just leave them defenseless to abusive informal and 
unofficial courts operating underground and out of public legal scrutiny. 
In Australia, Muslim communities have been a part of their cultural 
mosaic from the 19th century. Between 2006 and 2016, the Muslim 
population has grown almost double, over 600.000, making 2.6% of the 
total Australian population137. As it happens in Canada, it is an increasing 
fear of Islamization and it is an ongoing similar angry debate about 
banning or accommodating Sharia arbitrations courts that have been 
operating unofficially underground as personals laws for Australian 
Muslims outside the Australian legal system.  
Anne Black, after exploring critically the lessons from Britain and 
Canada138, considers that Australian society is not ready for the official 
recognition of Muslim arbitration, but without giving convincing 
arguments for it, besides the risk of isolation of Muslim communities that 
underground informal arbitration promotes too. She realizes that actually, 
Sharia courts for family disputes in Australia are indeed underground, 
leaving the parties involved in a dispute out of protection of the 
Australian laws. In this situation is not legally possible to verify the 
fairness neither in the arbitration process nor in the decision.  
In my view, formal religious arbitration under a secular state 
legislation offers more procedural guarantees, facilitating accommodation 
and harmonization of religious laws in a secular legal frame. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the inner pluralism of Islam, about schools 
of legal interpretation and ethnocultural backgrounds, can play an 




138 A. BLACK, “Accommodating Shariah Law in Australia´s Legal System. Can we? 
Should we?”, Alt Law JI (2008), pp. 214-219. (Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journ 
als/AltLawJl/2008/63.pdf) 
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important role facilitating a plural Muslim identity capable to integrate, 
British, Canadian or Australian identities under the fundamental and 
constitutional rights of those countries, without the negative aspects of 
assimilation and ghettoization. That is the challenge for Muslim and non-
Muslims citizens under secular juridical systems. 
 
 
13 - Conclusions 
 
We are witnessing a new era of fear and uncertainty, politically and 
economically, at the same time transnational migrations at large scale are 
increasing, and the coexistence of multicultural identities are becoming a 
source of new forms of religious and cultural intolerance and, eventually, 
new conflicts of identities are paving the path toward violence.  
Regrettably, now as always, political geostrategic games and the 
control for economic resources lead to inevitable confrontations and 
disintegrations among diverse communities when some political 
ideologies marginalized or excluded by demonizing some religious 
identities, even manipulating the public opinion by fear them, as a 
strategy in the rhetoric of power. As a result, the polarization between 
Westernization and Westoxificacion, as ideologies of manipulation, has 
been increased since the Iranian religious revolution and the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring. 
The meaning of identity, about who are we, is changing 
everywhere. The role of religion has been reviewed in secularized 
societies, creating new tensions and demands challenging the secular state 
paradigm when secular values are imposed over religious values, and 
both became opposed.  
The today´s world is located at a historical moment that faces the 
end of existing paradigms that are breaking down by erosion, and others 
are emerging by its needs. Whose features still are unknown and 
unpredictable, although ruled by the globalization process that is taking 
place in the last decades, and it is speeding up by the digital progress in 
communication. 
The dynamics of the evolving social process that history shows 
have provided us with empirical and practical tools for its analysis, but 
the complexities of today's world require a change of methodology 
dealing with the failures of aggressive secularization and assimilation 
policies that can have been channeling rejection from deeply rooted 
internal resentments. 
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Identity, religious and political, is a concept always attached to 
transformation and multiple realities. Static past or present identities are 
always imagined and cultural and global changes demand new 
mechanisms to face those challenges and give answer to the main juridical 
questions:  
 
 How can be accommodated dissimilar cultures and religious 
traditions into a secular nomocracy?  
 How plural identities and legal traditions can decentralize the state 
law system without reducing the guarantees of the fundamental 
rights?  
 How the fundamental right of religious freedom can be protected 
from religious oppression or secularist policies?  
 How to promote individual rights in religious communities that 
focus religious freedom as a communal right?  
 Can religion and religious legal systems become a tool of mediation 
for restorative justice preventing and exiting from violence? 
 
Religion can play a dual role, as a source of conflict or as a bridge to 
peacemaking, as an obstacle or as a strategy for conflict resolution. 
Religious communities and religious leaders can also engage in a powerful 
peacemaker´s role at three levels: leadership, inter-communal and intra-
communal. In international and transnational spaces, religious leaders can 
play an essential role bringing moral authority and respect as reliable and 
effective mediators, helping enormously in processes of building peace 
and reconciliation as well as in the interfaith dialogues. 
Religious leaders and religious organizations are taking active roles 
as peacemakers and promote religious interfaith dialogues, in which 
sacred texts can be a powerful tool and a moral anchor opening or 
facilitating, by theological shifts, a common ground in religious narratives, 
values, and peaceful coexistence. One of the biggest challenges to 
interfaith dialogues is to overcome defensive and emotional aspects of 
collective egos and self-identities promoting sectarianism, trying to prove 
that one of them possess the whole truth. Asymmetrical communities also 
represent a huge test for interfaith dialogues, when rapid social changes or 
new religious movements alter the traditional coexistence among 
communities.  
At an intra-communal level, religious organizations can channel 
private mediation and arbitration among their members in many multi-
dimensional paths. In recent years, the so-called religious arbitration has 
been developed in secular nation-states creating an ongoing legal and 
politically polarized debate regarding the legitimacy of religious courts, as 
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arbitration tribunals, under the secular rule of law system. This debate 
also reopened the multiculturalism discussions and the distinction 
between an old multiculturalism and a new multiculturalism, and the 
challenges of sectarianism, therefore, the risks of latent clashes between 
public policies or fundamental rights, and religious arbitration. For a 
successful religious arbitration, some principles should be guaranteed and 
rules should be implemented: 1) to prevent coercion on the members of a 
religious community to bring the case to a religious tribunal; 2) applying 
fair rules; 3) assuring individual fundamental rights; 4) and preventing the 
isolation of religious communities by emphasizing less interaction with 
the rest of the population and other communities in the society. As I said, 
in my view, formal religious arbitration under a secular state legislation 
offers more procedural guarantees, facilitating accommodation and 
harmonization of religious laws in a secular constitutional legal frame. 
We are witnessing an increasing process of globalization of 
knowledge, the 19th century´s division of sciences is outdated and fields of 
philosophy, law, sociology, political science, theology, economy… are 
merging into a new approach that requires flexible narratives preventing 
being lost in the translation among those fields and facilitating a 
constructive transdisciplinary dialogue among them. It is a collaborative 
task. We live in a nomos, in a world of laws; in this normative world, law 
and narrative are inseparable related. As Robert Cover explained139, we all 
live in a nomos world, constantly creating and maintaining a world of right 
or wrong, lawful or unlawful, valid or void, in this normative world law 
and narrative are deeply interconnected, because in the context of 
narratives, law is not only a system of rules to be observed and 
implemented but a world in which we live. Sacred texts in a broad sense, 
secular and religious, open the space for legal narratives and 
interpretations, myths and symbols, that legal traditions developed 
interactively establishing paradigms of behavior and communication in a 
dynamic social interaction. Legal systems and traditions, secular and 
religious, are able to create paths showing us how to live in this normative 
world and how to improve our coexistence under narratives that can 




                                                          
139 R.M. COVER, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and narrative" 
(1983). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2705. (Available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale. 
edu/fss_papers/2705). 
